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Euroopan unionin parlamentti hyväksyi maaliskuussa 2019 direktiivin tekijänoikeudesta 
digitaalisilla sisämarkkinoilla. Direktiivin artikla 17 tuo aikaisempaa ankarampia 
velvoitteita verkkosisällönjakopalvelujen tarjoajille, joiden katsotaan parhaiten kykenevän 
puuttumaan alustoillaan tapahtuviin tekijänoikeusloukkauksiin. Artiklan 17 esittelemien 
uusien vaatimusten mukaisesti palveluntarjoajien tulee jatkossa parhaansa mukaan pyrkiä 
estämään tekijänoikeuksia loukkaavan materiaalin päätyminen alustoilleen. 
Palveluntarjoajat eivät myöskään enää saa suojaa tilanteessa, jossa niillä ei ole ollut 
tosiasiallista tietoa tekijänoikeuksia loukkaavan materiaalin olemassaolosta alustallaan. 
 
Tämän tutkielman tarkoituksena on selvittää, noudattaako Unionin lainsäätäjän artiklassa 
17 hahmottelema perusoikeuksien välinen tasapaino aikaisempaa eurooppalaisessa 
oikeuskäytännössä löydettyä tasapainoa kilpailevien perusoikeuksien välillä. Kilpaileviksi 
perusoikeuksiksi on artiklan 17 kontekstissa identifioitu sanan- ja tiedonvälityksen vapaus, 
elinkeinovapaus ja tekijänoikeudet. Tutkielmassa tarkastellaan pääsääntöisesti Euroopan 
unionin tuomioistuimen sekä Euroopan ihmisoikeustuomioistuimen ratkaisuja, joissa on 
tasapainoiltu edellä mainittujen perusoikeuksien toteutumisen välillä. 
 
Artiklasta 17 havaittavissa olevan perusoikeuksien välisen tasapainon voidaan katsoa 
noudattavan elinkeinovapauden ja tekijänoikeuksien osalta oikeuskäytännössä kehittynyttä 
linjaa. Palveluntarjoajat ovat olleet etenevässä määrin tiukkojen vaatimusten kohteena 
tekijänoikeusloukkauksien ehkäisemiseksi ilman että vaatimusten katsottaisiin olevan 
tekijänoikeuksien toteutumisen kannalta kohtuuttomia tai loukkaavan elinkeinovapauden 
ydintä. Elinkeinovapauden on lisäksi oikeuskäytännössä nähty olevan arvoltaan 
vähäisempi perusoikeus. 
 
Linja ei sen sijaan ole yhtä selkeä tarkasteltaessa sanan- ja tiedonvälityksen vapauden sekä 
tekijänoikeuksien välistä tasapainoa. Verkon käyttäjien tiedonsaantioikeus on noussut 
oikeuskäytännössä keskeiseen asemaan, eikä artiklan 17 mahdollisesti aiheuttamien 
suojaustoimien voida katsoa tukevan tätä kehitystä. Lisäksi oikeuskäytännössä on arvioitu, 
että ainoan mahdollisen tiedonsaantiväylän häviäminen saattaa kajota oikeuden ytimeen, 
mikä vaikeuttaa entisestään palveluntarjoajien tehtävää perusoikeuksien välisen tasapainon 
käytännön toteuttajana. 
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The Directive on Copyright on the Digital Single Market was approved by the European 
Parliament in March 2019. Article 17 of the directive presents new stricter obligations for 
the online content sharing providers, who are best positioned to prevent copyright 
violations from occurring on their platforms. According to these new obligations the 
providers must with their best efforts strive to prevent the uploading of copyright infringing 
material on their platform. Furthermore, the providers are no longer shielded from liability 
in circumstances where they do not possess actual knowledge of infringing activities. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the fair balance between competing 
fundamental rights constructed by the legislator in Article 17 is in line with the established 
perception of fair balance visible in the case law of the European legal framework. The 
competing fundamental rights in the context of Article 17 are the freedom of expression 
and information, freedom to conduct a business and right to intellectual property. This 
examination of the case law is carried out primarily by discussing the judgments of Court 
of Justice of the European Union and European Court of Human Rights. 
 
The perceived balance between the freedom to conduct a business and the right to 
intellectual property can be seen falling in line with the previous case law. The content 
sharing providers have been subject to increasingly stricter measures which have not been 
deemed unproportioned or violating the essence of a right to conduct a business. 
Furthermore, the right to conduct a business has been regarded as a fundamental right of 
less significance in the case law. 
 
The relationship between previous case law and Article 17 is less consistent when it comes 
to the balance between the freedom of expression and information and right to intellectual 
property. The freedom of information of the users of the services has become a focal point 
in the case law and the potential protective measures initiated by Article 17 cannot be seen 
functioning well with this development. Furthermore, depriving the users of their sole mean 
of accessing information may constitute as a violation of the essence of the right to 
information. Consequently, the position of the service provider in implementing measures 
that fulfill the requirement of fair balance becomes more difficult. 
 
 
 
Subject matters: fair balance of fundamental rights, fair balance, intellectual property 
rights, freedom of expression and information, right to conduct a business, directive on 
copyright 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The Directive on Copyright on the Digital Single Market, hereinafter referred to as the 
Directive, was approved by the European Parliament in March 2019. It does not replace but is 
based upon and compliments the previous directives regarding copyright protection within the 
Union1. The Directive is an integral part of the Unions Digital Single Market Strategy, the 
purpose of which is to improve the accessibility to online goods and services for consumers and 
businesses, create a suitable environment for digital networks and services, and realize the full 
potential of a European Digital Economy. In practice, this means harmonizing and modernizing 
the legislation concerning e-commerce, data privacy and ownership, communication and the 
intellectual property, especially the legislation regarding copyright.2 
The reformation and harmonization of copyright legislation across the Union can be deemed as 
a central part of the DSM-strategy. EU has so far been interested in harmonizing the economic 
rights aspect of copyright protection which contains the provisions on how the right holders 
like authors and artists can have control over the use of their works while also getting an 
adequate monetary compensation for this use3. The more efficient protection and remuneration 
for the copyright owners is also clearly present in the upcoming copyright legislation, especially 
in Article 17 of the Directive, which regulates the use of protected content by online content 
sharing service providers such as YouTube, Reddit and Twitch.  
However, current best practices applied by the intermediaries, such as YouTube’s Content ID 
system, rely heavily on automatic filtering of the material uploaded on the platforms. Some of 
the weaknesses of these systems are, for example, their inability to recognize material protected 
under the exceptions and limitations to copyright listed in Article 5 of the InfoSoc. Directive4, 
                                                 
1 Directive 2019/790 of 17 April 2019 of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the Digital 
Single Market (2019) OJ L 130/92.  
2 Commission, “A Digital Single Market strategy for Europe” COM (2015)192 final, p. 20. 
3 Commission,” Copyright” < https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/copyright> accessed 13.3.2019. 
4 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of 
certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society (2002) OJ L 167. 
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such as parodies or reviews.5 Furthermore, the operating environment for the businesses of 
online intermediaries and online content providers might change drastically, perhaps even 
endangering the opportunity to conduct business within the Union.  
This is not to say that protecting intellectual property rights should not be an important aspect 
regarding the future of the internal market. According to a report by EUIPO6, the music industry 
within the Union suffered losses of €170 million in 2014 due to copyright infringements7. 
Looking at the global scale, it has been reported by ICC and INTA8 that digital IP-infringements 
towards movies, music and software amounted to $213 billion in 2013 and the figure was 
believed to grow to anywhere between $384 and $856 billion by 20229. The damage is not only 
suffered by the right holders but also the internal market, as jobs, tax revenues and consequently 
social security benefits are affected within the Union10. 
The importance of IP rights regarding the functioning of the internal market has long been 
understood by the Union, and they are firmly established as fundamental rights in EU. Article 
17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, hereinafter referred to as the 
Charter, affirms the right to property as a fundamental right, and intellectual property is 
included in this provision11. The position of right to property as a fundamental right is also 
apparent in the European Convention of Human Rights12. Therefore, it seems that the Directive 
                                                 
5 Leron Solomon, “Fair Users or Content Abusers: The Automatic Flagging of Non-Infringing Videos by Content 
ID on Youtube” (2015) 44 Hofstra L. Rev. 237, 257. 
6 European Union Intellectual Property Office. 
7 EUIPO, “The Economic Cost of IPR Infringement in the Recorded Music Industry” (2016) p. 5, < 
https://euipo.europa.eu/tunnel-web/secure/webdav/guest/document_library/observatory/resources/research-and-
studies/ip_infringement/study7/Music_industry_en.pdf>, accessed 2.4.2019. 
8 The International Chamber of Commerce and The International Trademark Association, respectively. 
9 ICC & INTA, “The Economic Impacts of Counterfeiting and Piracy” (2016) p. 8, < 
http://www.inta.org/Communications/Documents/2017_Frontier_Report.pdf>, accessed 2.4.2019. 
10 Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European 
Economic and Social Committee: A balanced IP enforcement system responding to today’s societal challenges” 
COM (2017) 707 final, p. 2. 
11 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/391. 
12 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, [1950] Art. 1. 
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is indeed an appropriate tool to more effectively achieve the status of intellectual property as a 
fundamental right. 
However, the aspects that could be affected by the stricter liability of intermediaries are also 
protected by the Charter. Freedom of expression and information alongside freedom to conduct 
a business are both covered by the respective Articles of 11 and 16 of the Charter. It is possible 
that the Directive might indirectly lead to the infringement of these fundamental rights. Article 
52(1) of the Charter provides that limitations on these rights must be proportional, in that they 
must be “necessary and genuinely meet the objectives of general interest” or must “protect the 
rights and freedom of others”. Moreover, these limitations must “respect the essence” of these 
rights. 
This thesis evaluates whether the fair balance between competing fundamental rights set by the 
legislator in Article 17 is following the guidelines presented in the European case law. This is 
done by examining the case law of CJEU13 and, to a lesser extent, that of ECtHR14. The purpose 
of this examination is to determine how far the Court has gone in protecting intellectual property 
as a fundamental right in the expense of other fundamental rights and whether the seemingly 
stricter responsibilities given for the online intermediaries set by the new Directive are in line 
with the Courts previous assessments. The examination focuses on those fundamental rights 
that can be deemed relevant considering the possibly pervasive effect of more efficient IP 
protection introduced by the Directive: freedom of expression and information and freedom to 
conduct a business. 
The type of research conducted in this paper is a combination of explanatory, empirical and 
evaluative research15. Largest portion of the paper focuses on presenting and explaining the 
judgments of the Courts in specific cases regarding the relevant fundamental rights. Amidst this 
descriptive research the paper compares the cases focusing on the ways the Courts have found 
the balance between competing fundamental rights, and whether certain rights seem to have a 
higher or lower level of protection than others. Finally, the paper evaluates whether the 
                                                 
13 Court of Justice of the European Union. 
14 European Court of Human Rights. 
15 Mark van Hoecke, “Legal Doctrine: Which Method(s) for What Kind of Discipline?” in Mark van Hoecke and 
François Ost (eds), Methodologies of Legal Research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline? (Hart 
Publishing 2011). 
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assessments of the Courts can be seen strengthening of hindering the proposed aims of Article 
17 of the Directive. 
This paper is divided into 6 parts. After the introduction, we will move on to Chapter 2, in 
which we will look at the status and primary sources of fundamental rights within the Union. 
Moreover, the general idea of balance between different fundamental rights is presented. In 
Chapter 3, intellectual property as a fundamental right in EU is introduced and its growing 
importance in both the legislative framework and in the European case-law is presented.  
Furthermore, the changes introduced by Article 17 of the new copyright directive are more 
thoroughly described. In Chapter 4, the freedom of expression and information as a fundamental 
right is briefly introduced, and then the case law regarding the balancing between this right and 
the right to intellectual property is examined. Chapter 5 is constructed in similar fashion 
discussing the status between freedom to conduct a business and the right to intellectual 
property. The paper ends with the concluding remarks of Chapter 6. 
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2 THE STATUS OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
2.1 Introduction 
The position of fundamental rights within EU has continuously strengthened. Currently, there 
are three distinguishable, albeit fundamentally interlinked, sources of human rights provisions 
affecting the Union legal order.16 These sources are presented in Article 6 of TEU17. Two of 
them have already been identified above as the Charter of Fundamental Rights and European 
Convention on Human Rights, the third one being the uncodified general principles of EU law. 
It is of paramount importance for the following discussion to understand this interrelationship 
between these sources, as the fair balance between two competing fundamental rights, such as 
freedom of expression and the right to intellectual property, is not only inspired by the previous 
judgments of CJEU which is why the following chapters will not solely focus on these 
judgements.  
First, I shall argue that despite the Charter being the most important fundamental rights 
instrument in the Union legal order, it is also affected by the ECHR as well as general principles 
of EU law. Secondly. I shall argue that fundamental rights have in the past on many occasions 
had an enormous impact on different legislative measures of the Union and implementing 
measures of the Member States. Thirdly, I shall present the interlinked concepts of 
proportionality of a measure, fair balance between fundamental rights and the essence of a right. 
Next, we will look at the three important fundamental right sources one by one, focusing on 
their role in the development of fundamental rights within the Union and specifically regarding 
their previous impact on the Union legislation. 
2.2 General principles of EU law 
Regarding the fundamental rights as general principles of EU law, Article 6(3) TEU states as 
follows: 
“Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common 
to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union's law” 
                                                 
16 Robert Schütze,” Three ‘Bills of Rights’ for the European Union” (2011) 30 YEL 131, 132. 
17 Treaty on European Union. 
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The general principles are European human rights independent from those of national 
constitutions18 but are nevertheless derived from the “common constitutional traditions” of 
Member States19. These traditions were defined as influencers to the general principles in 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft20, even though the principles themselves had already been 
introduced in Stauder21. In Nold22, ECJ further developed these principles by affirming that 
they are also inspired by international human rights conventions alongside the national 
constitutional traditions.23 Moreover, in Schmidberger, it was specified that ECHR is of 
fundamental importance in this respect.24 
Even though the general principles are not in a written form, it does not follow that their status 
as a source of law is lesser than that of ECHR or the Charter. In fact, Article 6 TEU elevates 
the general principles to the same level as ECHR and the Charter, that is, fundamental rights as 
general principles are primary law within the Union.25 As primary law, the general principles 
regarding fundamental freedoms alongside the Treaties should overcome secondary legislation 
such as directives and regulations.26 Indeed, there have been many instances in which 
fundamental rights as general principles of EU law have had, for example, impact on Member 
States’ implementation of Union legislation. This has happened especially after Wachauf27 and 
                                                 
18 Schütze (n 16) 132. 
19 Elise Muir,” The Fundamental Rights Implications of EU Legislation: Some Constitutional Challenges” (2014) 
51 CML Rev. 219, 242. 
20 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel 
EU:C:1970:114, para 4. 
21 Case 29/69 Erich Stauder v City of Ulm EU: C: 1969:57, para 7. 
22 Case 4/73 J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgrosshandlung v Commission EU:C:1974:51, para 13. 
23 Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (6th edn, Oxford University Press 2015) 
384 – 385. 
24 Case C–112/00 Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v Austria EU:C:2003:333, paras 71–72. 
See also: Robert Schütze,” Three ‘Bills of Rights’ for the European Union” (2011) 30 YEL 131, 138. 
25 Muir (n 19) 219. 
26 Phil Syrpis,” The Relationship Between Primary and Secondary Law in the EU” (2015) 52 CML Rev. 461, 461. 
27 Case 5/88 Hubert Wachauf v Germany EU:C:1989:321, para 17. 
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before the Charter became binding28, however, the principles have not become irrelevant after 
the status of the Charter changed either. Furthermore, the principles have had effect regarding 
actions towards secondary legislation itself. 
In Elgafaji, for example, Directive 2004/83/EC on persons eligible for subsidiary protection 
was interpreted in favor of the applicant in the light of general principles of EU law.29 Similarly 
in Bavarian Lager, data privacy and protection overcame the transparency doctrine.30 In both 
of these cases, ECHR functioned as an inspiration for the interpretation of the general 
principles. Parliament v Council31 is a rare instance where the Court drew from another source 
of international human rights instrument than ECHR and refused the annulment of specific 
provisions of the Family Reunification Directive32 requested by the Parliament.  ECJ’s 
seemingly reluctant attitude to use other international human rights instruments as a source of 
inspiration has raised criticism.33  
As for the effect of common constitutional traditions of Member States to the general principles 
regarding fundamental rights, the situation has been far from straightforward since the landmark 
Hauer34-case, in which the importance of these constitutional traditions was reaffirmed35. There 
have been some instances where the Court’s approach regarding these traditions common to 
Member States has been less contested, such as Omega36where the Court was able to establish 
                                                 
28 For case law regarding fundamental rights review of national measures pre- and post-CFR, see: Jukka Snell, 
“Fundamental Rights Review of National Measures: Nothing New under the Charter?” (2016) 21 EPL 285. 
29 Case C-465/07 Elgafaji v Staatssecretaris van Justitie EU:C: 2009:94, para 28. 
30 Case C-28/08 Commission v Bavarian Lager EU:C: 2010:378, para 62. See also: Els J. Kindt, Privacy and Data 
Protection Issues of Biometric Applications: A Comparative Legal Analysis (Springer 2013) 413. 
31 Case C-540/03 Parliament v Council EU:C:2006:429, para 37. In this case, the Court drew from International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and from Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
32 Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification [2003] OJ L 251/12. 
33 Olivier de Schutter and Israel de Jesús Butler, “Binding the EU to International Human Rights Law” (2006) 27 
YEL 277, 282 – 283. 
34 Case 44/79 Liselotte Hauer v. Rheinland-Pflaz EU:C:1979:290. 
35 Sejal Parmar,” International Human Rights and the EU Charter” (2001) 8 MJ 351, 352. 
36 Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellung- GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt 
Bonn EU: C: 2004:614. In this case, German authorities prohibited Omega from selling games containing 
simulation of killing people by the grounds of it being against German constitution. Omega argued that this was 
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that looking for inspiration from common constitutional traditions does not necessarily lead to 
a situation where the measures adopted by the most lenient Member State are automatically a 
benchmark for the ECJ. Furthermore, it is not at all clear that a measure adopted by most 
Member States becomes a common tradition which has effect on general principles if the 
differences between the approaches are not small, as evident in Grant37.38 Interesting and 
controversial positions of ECJ have also emerged through cases such as Mangold and 
Kükükdeveci39 which suggest that the general principles of Union law regarding fundamental 
rights might in fact be hierarchically superior to other primary law40. 
2.3 The European Convention on Human Rights 
ECHR is the second source of inspiration for the protection of fundamental rights within the 
Union. Article 6(2) of TEU states: 
”The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession shall not affect the Union's competences as defined in 
the Treaties.” 
EU has not acceded to ECHR as promised in the article and it does not look like this suggestion 
is going to materialize in the foreseeable future either41. However, regardless of the ultimate 
result of the accession plan, ECHR has had and more than likely continues to have a major role 
in the human rights framework of the Union. This has occurred through two different routes. 
Firstly, ECHR affects the general principles and the Charter directly and through the 
constitutions of the Member States42. As evident from the above discussion on the significance 
                                                 
against freedom to provide services, but ECJ stated that the action by German authorities was in proportion to the 
task it was set to fulfill, even though some EU Members were less restrictive in their measures. 
37 Case C-249/96 Lisa Jacqueline Grant v South West Trains Ltd. EU:C:1998:63.  
38 Koen Lenaerts and José A. Gutiérrez-Fons, “The Constitutional Allocation of Powers and General Principles of 
EU Law” (2010) 47 CML Rev. 1629, 1634 – 1635; 1663; 1667. For the cases having to do with a fundamental EU 
value, see cases: Case C-438/05 ITF and FSU v. Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eest EU:C:2007:772 and 
Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, EU:C:2007:809.  
39 Case C-144/04 Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm EU: C: 2005:709 and Case C-555/07 Seda Kücüdeveci v 
Swedex GmbH EU: C: 2010:21. 
40 Vojtech Belling, “Supranational Fundamental Rights or Primacy of Sovereignty” (2012) 18 ELJ 251, 254. 
41 Opinion 2/13 “Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms” [2014]. 
42 Robert Schütze,” Three ‘Bills of Rights’ for the European Union” (2011) 30 YEL 131, 158. 
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of fundamental rights as general principles of EU law, it is not always unproblematic to try and 
distinguish the effects of ECHR from those of the general principles. The same can be said of 
the relationship between the Charter and ECHR, which we will examine below. Secondly, 
ECHR affects the fundamental rights framework of EU as an “external bill”43, which most 
transparently manifests itself through Article 52(3) of the Charter: 
”In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those 
rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not 
prevent Union law providing more extensive protection” 
According to the article, ECHR provides a “floor” of a sorts for the fundamental rights 
protection of the CJEU. The article also states that even though these so-called minimum 
standards are thus firmly set by the ECHR, it does not mean that CJEU could not establish 
higher standards. In the hallmark Bosphorus44 ruling, ECtHR constructed a rule of thumb 
according to which EU can generally be presumed to offer an amount of protection equivalent 
to the ECHR unless facts of a case prove otherwise. Moreover, the presumption does not apply 
in situations where the Member State has had an opportunity to use its own discretion regarding 
the implementation of the EU measure, as in the case of directives.45 
There has been notable reluctance on behalf of ECtHR to review EU actions46. However, it has 
on rare occasions reviewed actions of the Member States acting within their competence giving 
effect to EU legislation47. Moreover, referencing of ECHR by CJEU is not an entirely one-sided 
affair, as ECtHR has also frequently referenced the Charter48.49  
                                                 
43 ibid 158. 
44 Bosphorus v Ireland App no 45036/98 (ECtHR, 30 June 2005). 
45 Johan Callewaert, “Do we still need Article 6(2) TEU? Considerations on the absence of EU accession to the 
ECHR and its consequences” (2018) 55 CML Rev. 1685, 1692 – 1693. 
46 Connolly v 15 Member States of the European Union App no 73275/01 (ECtHR, 8 December 2004). 
47 For example Matthews v United Kingdom App no 24833/94 (ECtHR, 18 February 1999). 
48 For example Goodwin v United Kingdom App no 28957/95 (ECtHR, 12 April 2006).  
49 Rhona Smith,” Interaction between international human rights law and the European legal framework” in 
Christophe Geige (ed) Research Handbook on Human Rights and Intellectual Property (Edward Elgar Publishing 
2015). 
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2.4 The Charter of Fundamental Rights 
The most important individual written document regarding the protection of fundamental rights 
within the Union is the Charter. Article 6(1) TEU states as follows: 
” The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 December 
2007, which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties.” 
After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Charter became legally binding and is now 
to be treated of equal value to other EU Treaties as a source of law50. This does not mean, 
however, that the Charter would have been of no importance pre-Lisbon. From its approval in 
2000 to the determining and strengthening of its legal status in 2009, it served as an inspiration 
in a plethora of cases concerning challenges to EU legislation and Member States action 
regarding implementation. Perhaps the most notable case in this transitional era is Kadi51, in 
which United Nations and EU had ordered sanctions against individuals associated with Al-
Qaida and Taliban in the post 9/11 turmoil. ECJ proceeded to strike down Council Regulation 
881/2002 as it had effectively made the financial assets of Mr. Kadi completely unavailable to 
him, thus violating his right to property52. Other cases challenging EU legislation pre-Lisbon 
include Netherlands v Council and Parliament and European Parliament v Council53. Cases 
challenging Member State implementation include Promusicae and Tietosuojavaltuutettu54. 
It is safe to say that the coming into effect of the Charter as a legally binding instrument was 
not as great of a shock to the EU legal system as it could have been thanks to the fact that it was 
                                                 
50 Elise Muir, “The Fundamental Rights Implications of EU Legislation: Some Constitutional Challenges” (2014) 
51 CML Rev. 219, 219. 
51 Case C-402/05 P & 415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi, Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and 
Commission EU:C:2008:46. 
52 Andrea Gattini,” Joined Cases C-402/05 P & 415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi, Al Barakaat International 
Foundation v. Council and Commission, judgment of the Grand Chamber of 3 September 2008, nyr.” (2009) 46 
CML Rev. 213, 222 – 223. 
53 Case C-377/98 Netherlands v Council and Parliament EU:C:2001:523 which concerns possible human dignity 
violations of the Biotechnology Directive and Case C-540/03 European Parliament v Council EU:C: 2006:429 
which concerns possible violation regarding respect to family life by the Family Reunification Directive. See Paul 
Craig and Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (6th edn, Oxford University Press 2015) 401. 
54 Case C-275/06 Promusicae v Telefónica de España SAU EU:C: 2008:54 regarding the conflict between right to 
property and data protection, and Case C-73/07 Tietosuojavaltuutettu v Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy 
EU:C:2008:727 concerning the conflict between freedom of expression and privacy rights. See ibid 412. 
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used as an inspiration and made a familiar part of the Unions legislative framework beforehand. 
However, this does not mean that the post-Lisbon era has been identical to the years preceding 
the Lisbon Treaty, for fundamental rights have assumed a central role both on the Union level 
and before national courts as the number of cases concerning human rights has grown.55 
Furthermore, the Charter did not introduce new rights but rather made the already established 
rights visible56. 
It is important to note that most of the rights protected by the Charter are not absolute, that is, 
they can be subject to limitations. The key provision in this regard is Article 52(1) of the 
Charter, which states: 
”Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter must be 
provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle 
of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet 
objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and 
freedoms of others.” 
First, the limitation must respect the “essence” of the right and freedoms that are being limited. 
In most cases the essence is not clearly defined. However, it can be argued that all fundamental 
rights possess a “core” and interfering with this core deprives all or a distinct group of right 
holders from enjoyment of the right in question57.  The general idea behind this core or essence 
within the human rights presented in the Charter is inspired by both Member States’ 
constitutions and ECHR as evident in the respective Articles 52(4) and 52(3) of the Charter58. 
The essence of a fundamental right is not specifically mentioned in ECHR but the idea is clearly 
visible in numerous judgements of ECtHR59. 
                                                 
55 Sara Iglesias Sánchez,” The Court and the Charter: The impact of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 
the ECJ´s approach to fundamental rights” (2012) 49 CML Rev. 1565, 1609. 
56 Protocol (No 30) on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and 
to the United Kingdom [2016] C 202/312. 
57 Maja Brkan,” The Concept of Essence of Fundamental Rights in the EU Legal Order: Peeling the Onion to its 
Core” (2018) 14 Eu Const. 332, 368. 
58 See ibid 339. 
59 E.g. Belgian Linguistic App. no 2126/64 (ECtHR, 23 July 1968), in which the Court stated that “such regulation 
must never injure the substance of the right to education --” (emphasis added). See Jonas Cristoffersen,” Human 
rights and balancing: The principle of proportionality” in Christophe Geige (ed) Research Handbook on Human 
Rights and Intellectual Property (Edward Elgar Publishing 2015). Other examples include Goodwin v United 
Kingdom App. no 17488/90 (ECtHR, 11 July 2002) and Heaney and McGuinness v Ireland App. no 34720/97 
(ECtHR, 21 December 2000). 
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The second essential aspect of Article 52(1) is the principle of proportionality. Proportionality 
is a general principle of EU law, which provides that measures taken by the Union or the 
Member States within the scope of EU law “should be appropriate for attaining the objective 
and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it”60. Thus, the “proportionality test” can 
be seen comprising of three parts, which are suitability, necessity and proportionality of the 
measure.61 The last stage of the test focuses on determining whether the measure that has been 
imposed to achieve the sought objective has been excessive considering the burden suffered by 
the individual62. There has been some discussion on whether CJEU on its own initiative takes 
the third stage of the proportionality test into consideration as an independent part of the test or 
does it in practice often merge with the previous two stages63. 
Closely interlinked with the principle of proportionality is the principle of fair balance. As with 
most principles regarding the fundamental rights, the exact relationship of these two principles 
is somewhat complex. Some commentators see the fair balance principle as a variant of the 
principle of proportionality64 while others, at least in the context of the ECtHR, see it as a 
mandatory basis under which the proportionality test can be conducted65. Whatever the case, 
the concept of fair balance is, if possible, even vaguer than that of proportionality. Nevertheless, 
the requirement of fair balance between competing fundamental rights has been stated in 
numerous CJEU cases66. 
There are a handful of CJEU cases that at the same time encapsulate the relationship between 
the essence of a fundamental right and the principle of proportionality while also showcasing 
the momentum the Charter can have in a situation where a fair balance has not been struck 
                                                 
60 Case C-491/01 British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco EU:C: 2002:741. 
61 Michael Wimmer, “The Dinghy’s Rudder: General Principles of European Union Law through the Lens of 
Proportionality” (2014) 20 EPL 331, 338. 
62 Craig and de Búrca (no 57) 551. 
63 ibid. 
64 Peter Oliver and Christopher Stothers, “Intellectual property under the Charter: Are the Court’s scales properly 
calibrated” (2017) 54 CML Rev. 517, 546. 
65 Alastair Mowbray, “A Study of the Principle of Fair Balance in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights” (2010) 10 HRL Rev. 289, 308. 
66 E.g. Case C-283/11 Sky Österreich GmbH v Österreichischer Rundfunk EU:C: 2013:28 para 60. 
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between competing fundamental rights. One of the most important cases with these qualities is 
Digital Rights Ireland67, which led to the demise of the Data Retention Directive68. The Data 
Retention Directive gave electronic communication service providers a duty to collect and store 
information, such as the recipient and the sender of a message, in order to more effectively 
enable battling serious crime, such as terrorism69. Content of the messages, however, was not 
among the data gathered70. The national implementing measures of the Directive were 
challenged for being incompatible with EU law, especially with data protection and privacy, 
and subsequently questions were referred to ECJ by the national courts71. 
The Court examined whether the essence of the rights of data privacy and protection were 
infringed but came to the conclusion that this was not the case, as the content of the messages 
was not being captured72 and the directive set adequate requirements for the communication 
providers to ensure the protection of the data73. The Court then engaged in a proportionality 
test. The “general interests” -requirement was met, as the directive sought to harmonize the 
measures taken by the Member States while actively strengthening the fundamental right of 
security captured by Article 6 of the Charter74. Moreover, the directive was deemed suitable, as 
it achieved its purpose75. However, the directive failed the necessity test, as the Court among 
other arguments stated that the idea behind gathering information of ultimately every single 
person in EU with no limitation regarding the time nor the place of the messages sent was 
                                                 
67 Joined cases C-293 & 594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd and Seitlinger and others EU:C:2014:54. 
68 Council Directive 2006/24/EC of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection 
with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks 
and amending Directive 2002/58/EC (Data Retention Directive) [2006] L 105/54. 
69 ibid Art. 1(1). 
70 ibid Art. 1(2). 
71 Orla Lynskey,” The Data Retention Directive is incompatible with the rights to privacy and data protection and 
is invalid in its entirety: Digital Rights Ireland” (2014) 51 CML Rev. 1789, 1792. 
72 Digital Rights Ireland (n 67) para 39. 
73 ibid para 40. 
74 ibid paras 41 – 44. 
75 ibid para 46. 
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disproportionate when compared to the aim of the directive76. The Data Retention Directive 
was consequently declared void77, seemingly because the balance between the right to security 
and right to effective data protection and privacy was not fair. 
Another hallmark case that is especially useful in comprehending the vague and problematic 
relationship between the essence of a right and proportionality is Schrems78. In this case, Mr. 
Schrems requested the Irish Data Protection Commissioner to examine the data transfer of 
Facebook Ireland from EU to United States under the Safe Harbour Decision79 in the wake of 
the Snowden revelations of 2013 regarding the unlimited data retention practiced by the US 
intelligence agencies80. The Irish Data Protection Commissioner rejected the request based on 
the Safe Harbour Decision and the case eventually landed before ECJ. 
ECJ declared the Safe Harbour Decision invalid81. Unlike in Digital Rights Ireland, the Court 
did not engage in the proportionality test to determine the fair balance between privacy and 
security82. Instead, ECJ argued that the essence of the fundamental right to respect for private 
life was compromised because the content of the communication could be accessed by public 
authorities83. Despite the perfect opportunity for ECJ to perhaps clarify its standing regarding 
a fair balance between two competing fundamental rights, in this context privacy and security, 
it seemed to be reluctant to do so84. The concept of essence of a fundamental right is therefore 
                                                 
76 ibid paras 56, 58 – 59. 
77 ibid para 69. 
78 Case C-362/14 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner EU:C:2015:117. 
79 Commission Decision 2000/520/EC of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the safe harbour privacy principles and related 
frequently asked questions issued by the US Department of Commerce [2000] OJ L 215/7. The decision recognized 
US as having an “adequate level of protection” regarding data privacy and protection -policies, and thus those 
private entities which resided in US and were committed to complying with EU data protection rules could receive 
data from Member States without further guarantees. See ibid paras 1 – 5. 
80 Loïc Azoulai and Marijn van der Sluis, “Institutionalizing personal data protection in times of global institutional 
distrust: Schrems” (2016) 53 CML Rev. 1343, 1343. 
81 Schrems (n 78) para 105. 
82 Azoulai and van der Sluis (n 80) 1365 – 1366. 
83 Schrems (n 78) para 94. 
84 Azoulai and van der Sluis (n 80) 1365 – 1366. 
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problematic as it might in some cases prevent the perhaps more useful examination of the fair 
balance between two fundamental rights. At the same time, however, the concept of essence 
might help to determine the boundaries in which the proportionality review can take place in if 
the Court has provided some guidelines on what constitutes as the essence of a right in question. 
2.5 Conclusions on the sources and status of fundamental rights in EU 
Fundamental rights as general principles of EU law, ECHR and the Charter together form an 
integrated, albeit complex, framework for the human rights protection of the Union. Even 
though the Charter can be identified as the most important part of this trinity, it is clearly 
affected by the other two as evident from the wording of the Charter.  
It is also evident from the above discussion that fundamental rights have enormous influence in 
the legislative framework of the Union. Firstly, they can have direct impact on EU legislation, 
such as regulations, directives and decisions, as apparent in the respective cases of Kadi, Digital 
Rights Ireland and Schrems. What is especially important in the context of directives, however, 
is the fact that Member State implementation of Union legislation has also been the object of 
fundamental rights -scrutiny, as showcased in Promusicae and Tietosuojavaltuutettu. It is thus 
far from certain that the future only holds smooth sailing and favorable winds for the Directive 
if questions regarding the resulting fundamental rights aspects should arise. 
Most of the fundamental rights provided in the Charter are not absolute in nature, that is, they 
can be subject to limitations if certain preconditions are met. These preconditions are suitability, 
necessity and proportionality of the limitation, and together they form the proportionality test, 
which is then conducted by the Court. Closely related to the principle of proportionality is the 
“fair balance” of fundamental rights, which is often sought between two or more competing 
non-absolute human rights. It must be noted that the terms proportionality and fair balance are 
both inherently vague in nature, and this is why the following discussion regarding the fair 
balance between the rights to freedom of expression and freedom to conduct a business against 
right to property is always heavily dependent on the factual background of the judgment in 
question.  
What further complicates the matter is the concept of “essence” of a right, which according to 
previous judgements of ECtHR and CJEU can never be infiltrated by the influence of another 
right. As is the case with fair balance, there are no clear guidelines on what exactly constitutes 
 
16 
 
as the essence of a right, however, previous judgments regarding the interrelationship between 
the rights discussed in this paper will hopefully shed some light on where the Court(s) have 
drawn the line in the past. This will, in turn, help to evaluate whether the measures suggested 
to be taken by Article 17 of the Directive are a logical continuum in EU copyright protection, 
or whether these measures are a sudden turn when compared to the previous fair balance set by 
the Court.  
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3 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT IN EU 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I shall first introduce the right to intellectual property as a fundamental right in 
the Union legal order. After this, I shall briefly present the history of IP-protection within the 
Union legal order. Then, I shall present the new copyright directive and argue that it lays more 
proactive responsibilities for the online intermediary. Lastly, I shall argue that intermediaries 
have been the target of continuously stricter measures while the position of IP-rights has 
strengthened. 
The right to intellectual property is established in Article 17 of the Charter, which states: 
“1. Everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or her lawfully acquired 
possessions. No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the public interest and 
in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair compensation being paid 
in good time for their loss. The use of property may be regulated by law in so far as is necessary 
for the general interest.  
2. Intellectual property shall be protected.” 
Looking at the article, it may at first glance seem that it has mainly to do with the concept of 
protecting “traditional”, tangible property, and that addressing intellectual property rights has 
been added in only as an afterthought. Another possible impression left by this article could be 
that the right to intellectual property is somehow stronger than that of tangible property, as there 
are no visible exceptions regarding intellectual property, unlike in the first part of the 
provision85. However, both of these readings of the article would be incorrect. 
As for the first reading, it is important to notice that Article 17(2) is heavily inspired by ECHR 
Article 1 of Protocol 1, and thus ECHR in accordance with Article 52(3) of the Charter provides 
a “floor” for the protection of intellectual property in EU86. Thus, the right to intellectual 
property as a right is not neglected at Union level. As for the second reading, explanations 
relating to the Charter confirm that the guarantees provided in paragraph 1 of the Article 17, 
                                                 
85 Chritophe Geiger,” Intellectual property shall be protected!? – Article 17 (2) of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union: A Mysterious Provision with an Unclear Scope” (2009) 31 EIPR 113, 115.  
86 Martin Husovec, “Intellectual Property Rights and Integration by Conflict: The Past, Present and Future” (2016) 
18 CYELS 239, 241. 
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where applicable, also concern intellectual property87. Both the right to property and to 
intellectual property should hence, at least in theory, be evenly respected as fundamental rights. 
Thus, the aspects that intellectual property legislation strives to protect, which are mainly the 
free and exclusive use of one’s intellectual property and the enjoyment of the profits associated 
with such use, should possess the same level of protection as tangible property.  
However, the right to intellectual property is not absolute. Article 5 of the InfoSoc Directive 
presents an extensive list of exceptions and limitations to the reproduction right and the right to 
communication to the public. These exceptions include quotations, reviews, parody, and use 
for the benefit of public security to name a few. The Union has not in so far recognized any 
exceptions outside this list introduced in the InfoSoc Directive, that is, the list is inclusive88. 
It must be noted that copyright legislation is only a part of the entire framework of IP-related 
legislation, as the term “intellectual property” also covers, among others, trademarks and 
patents. However, it would be counterproductive for the following discussion to try and filter 
only those cases that have to do with copyright issues from the body of cases that have to do 
with balancing the right to intellectual property with other fundamental rights. First reason for 
this is purely semantical: The Charter does not specifically classify different categories of 
fundamental rights, but rather focuses on the overarching term of “intellectual property”. 
Secondly, and partly relating to the first point, filtering out intellectual property judgements in 
which the Court engages in a fair balance or proportionality review only because they are not 
to do with copyright issues per se might hamper the understanding of the overall stance of the 
Court regarding the relationship between intellectual property and other fundamental rights. 
Moreover, ignoring these cases completely prevents addressing possible differences in 
determining the fair balance when comparing copyright to other forms of intellectual property. 
Lastly, the different types of intellectual property judgements are not artificially separated by 
                                                 
87 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ C303/02, 23. 
88 Christophe Geiger and Elena Izyumenko, “Towards a European 'Fair Use' Grounded in Freedom of Expression” 
(2019) 35 American International Law Review 1, 9 – 10. 
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the Courts either. For example, in the SABAM -cases89 CJEU applied its reasoning established 
in cases having to do with trademark law to infringement of copyright90.  
The liability aspects of online intermediaries in the InfoSoc and Enforcement91 directives focus 
on the injunctions that the right holder can apply for against intermediaries. What is especially 
noteworthy concerning the topic of this paper is that the provisions of the E-Commerce 
Directive92 relating to the liability of the online intermediary also regulate the liability of online 
service providers regarding copyright infringements93. The E-Commerce Directive offers 
provisions on the general non-liability of information transmission service providers regarding 
the information communicated by the recipient of the service. This “mere conduit” provision is 
described in Article 12 of the E-Commerce Directive. Moreover, the directive prohibits any 
general monitoring obligations that may be required from the intermediary as per Article 15.  
In order to evaluate whether the new copyright directive can be seen as a logical continuum of 
the fair balance established in previous case law and legislation between the IP-rights and the 
freedom of expression and information and the freedom to conduct a business, we must first 
understand the most important developments regarding intellectual property as a fundamental 
right and the role of the online intermediary. Despite the holistic view of intellectual property 
cases explained above, the most significant developments in copyright legislation and online 
intermediary liability will also be included in the discussion. This is done in parallel with the 
discussion on the significant developments of IP rights in general in order to more clearly 
showcase the simultaneous evolution occurring in the case law. 
                                                 
89 Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended SA v. Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM) 
EU:C:2011:771 and Case C-360/10 Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componistenen Uitgevers CVBA (SABAM) 
v Netlog NV EU:C:2012:85. These cases will be more thoroughly examined in the subsequent chapters. 
90 Matthias Leistner,” Europe’s copyright law decade: Recent case law of the European Court of Justice and policy 
perspectives” (2014) 51 CML Rev. 559, 591. 
91 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights [2004] OJ L157/45. 
92 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of 
information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic 
commerce (2002) OJ L 178/1. 
93 Arts.12 – 15 of the E-Commerce Directive, Art. 8(3) of the InfoSoc Directive and Arts. 11 and 9(1) of the 
Enforcement Directive. 
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With these objectives in mind this chapter is divided into 4 parts. First, we are briefly going to 
look at the history of protection of property and intellectual property within the Union. The 
second part of the chapter introduces the relevant articles from the earlier copyright related 
directives having to do with the liability of an online intermediary. After this, Article 17(4) of 
the new Directive is then briefly introduced, as this provision deals with the requirements set 
for the online content sharing provider. The third part strives to offer some insight on the 
developments in the European IP case law that have influenced the changes that have affected 
the liability of the online content sharing provider, and also those cases that have had an impact 
in the broader position of IP towards other fundamental rights. Last part of the chapter offers 
concluding remarks related to this discussion. 
3.2 The road of IP towards the status of fundamental right 
The European Union began legislating on matters relating to intellectual property since the 
establishment of EEC in 1957 with the Treaty of Rome94. In 1962, it enacted its first piece of 
secondary legislation implementing the Articles 85 and 86 of EEC that have to do with, among 
other things, industrial property rights such as patents, utility models and trademarks95. The first 
shades of the upcoming fundamental importance of IP-rights were already visible in the 
predecessors of Article 36 TFEU, which listed the “protection of industrial and commercial 
property” as one of the viable justifications for obstacles of free movement. It did not take long 
before Article 36 included the entire array of IP legislation ranging from industrial rights such 
as patents and trademarks to personal rights such as copyrights96. 
The first proper wave of intellectual property legislation came in the 1990s as EU was in the 
process of negotiating three significant international agreements related to IP-rights: the TRIPS 
Agreement97, the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Phonograms and Performances 
                                                 
94 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community [1957]. 
95 Council Regulation of 21 February 1962 REGULATION No 17 First Regulation implementing Articles 85 arid 
86 of the Treaty [1962] OJ 204/62. 
96 Husovec (n 86) 343. 
97 The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. 
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Treaty98. A large part of the body of legislation adopted during this period was related to 
copyright99. It cannot be said that the Union had been slacking in terms of these legislative 
measures, as this period was also a revolutionary decade in the lawmaking of intellectual 
property forerunners such as USA100, who were a major force behind modernizing international 
copyright legislation in the mid-1990s101.  
Despite the IP legislation and the case law relating to it being in a relative stage of infancy, by 
the 1990s, many crucial developments had occurred in the Union case law regarding the 
“traditional” right to property. The seminal judgements in this regard were the cases of Nold 
and Hauer from the 1970s102. Both these cases were to do with the claimant arguing that Union 
legislative action resulted in breach of her right to property. In Nold, the claimant argued that a 
Commission decision affecting its position as the direct wholesaler of Ruhr coal violated this 
right but CJEU responded that property rights can be limited in accordance with public interest. 
Moreover, CJEU suggested that the property rights of the Member States “must be viewed in 
the light of the social function of the property”.103 
In Hauer, the claimant argued that a Council Regulation banning the plantation of new vines 
violated her right to property. CJEU turned to its judgement in Nold and argued that this was 
not the case as the regulation does not affect the access or freedom to pursue that occupation 
on land already in use. Furthermore, CJEU reiterated the argument from Nold regarding the 
societal function of the property.104 The argument of the Court regarding this social function 
                                                 
98 Péter Mezei and István Harkai, “Enforcement of Copyrights over the Internet: A Review of the recent case law” 
(2017) 21 Journal of Internet Law 12, 13. 
99 WIPO, <https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/legislation/profile/EU>, accessed 7.6.2019. 
100 WIPO, <https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/legislation/profile/US>, accessed 8.6.2019. 
101 Peter Drahos, “The universality of intellectual property rights: Origins and development” (1998) WIPO Panel 
Discussion on Intellectual Property and Human Rights, Geneva. http://www.wipo.int/edocs/ 
mdocs/tk/en/wipo_unhchr_ip_pnl_98/wipo_unhchr_ip_pnl_98_1.pdf, accessed 8.6.2019. 
102 Peter Oliver and Christopher Stothers, “Intellectual property under the Charter: Are the Court’s scales properly 
calibrated” (2017) 54 CML Rev. 517, 538. 
103 Nold (n 22) para 14. 
104 Hauer (n 34) para 32. 
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would later be in the center of the first case underlining the constitutional importance of IP-
rights. 
The case that brought IP-rights to the field of fundamental rights was Metronome Musik105. In 
this case, Music Point Hokamp, which was in the business of renting compact discs, was subject 
to an injunction filed by Metronome Musik, a company in the field of producing sound 
recordings. The injunction was based on Article 1(1) of the no longer valid Directive on rental 
and lending right, which gave the holder of the copyright an opportunity to prohibit the rental 
of works that were protected by the copyright106. Music Point Hokamp argued that the 
injunction was violating its freedom to conduct a trade or profession, and the case landed before 
CJEU. According to the Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro both the freedom to pursue a 
trade or profession and the right to property are general principles of Community law107. As in 
Hauer and Nold, the Court continued by stating the social function relating the principles must 
be taken into consideration. Furthermore, it was reaffirmed that neither of these rights is 
absolute and hence they can be restricted if those restrictions are proportionate and in favor of 
general interests pursued by the Union.108 
CJEU chose to uphold the Article 1(1) of the rental directive. It based its decision on the fact 
that the increasing threat of piracy coupled with the high and risky investments on behalf of the 
producers of the recording warranted the strict measure.109 Moreover, the Court also noted that 
according to Article 36 TFEU the protection artistic property is a justifiable reason to restrict 
the free movement of goods. The Court also derived inspiration from general principles of 
Member States and the Union, which apparently most clearly manifested themselves through 
                                                 
105 Case C-200/96 Metronome Musik GmbH v Music Point Hokamp GmbH EU:C: 1998:172. 
106 Council Directive 92/100/EEC of 19 November 1992 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights 
related to copyright in the field of intellectual property [1992] OJ L 346/61. 
107 C-200/96 Metronome Musik v Music Point Hokamp EU:C:1998:18, Opinion of AG Tesauro, para 21. 
108 Metronome Musik (n 105) para 21. See also: Husovec (n 86) 242. 
109 Some authors such as Mylly have heavily criticized the proportionality test conducted by the Court. See: 
Tuomas Mylly,” The constitutionalization of the European legal order: Impact of human rights on intellectual 
property in the EU” in Christophe Geiger (ed) Research Handbook on Human Rights and Intellectual Property 
(Edward Elgar Publishing 2015). 
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international treaties such as the TRIPS Agreement, which also supported these restrictive 
measures.110 
3.3 The liability of the online content sharing provider in Article 17 of the new copyright 
Directive and the great contrast to the earlier E-Commerce Directive 
Metronome Musik had just thus started the development of intellectual property, and evidently 
copyright rights, in the framework of human rights within the Union. Regarding legislative 
measures, next steps on this path were the E-Commerce Directive of the year 2000, the 
Information Society Directive of 2001 and the Enforcement Directive of 2004. These pieces of 
secondary legislation all strived to more effectively enforce IP-rights111. The purpose of the 
InfoSoc Directive was to greatly harmonize many important concepts related to copyright 
law112, such as exceptions and limitations to copyright presented in Article 5. The Enforcement 
Directive is the only legal instrument that encompasses all IP-rights within the Union113 and 
mainly provides tools for IP-right holders in order to better defend themselves against IP 
violations114.  
Intermediaries have traditionally been protected by numerous exceptions both in and outside 
the EU for user generated content115. In the Union legislation intermediaries have been 
exempted from primary liability regarding this content both in InfoSoc Directive and the E-
Commerce Directive. In Article 12 paragraph 1 of the E-Commerce Directive it is stated that 
intermediary service providers are not liable for the transmitted information as long as they 
don’t actively participate in the initiation or content of the transmission or select its recipient. 
However, what is most significant regarding the changes made in Article 17 of the new 
                                                 
110 Metronome Musik (n 105) paras 23 – 26. 
111 Matthias Leistner,” Copyright law in the EC: Status quo, recent case law and policy perspectives” [2009] 46 
CML Rev. 847, 871. 
112 Christophe Geiger and Franciska Schönherr, “The Information Society Directive” in Irini Stamatoudi and Paul 
Torremans (eds.) EU Copyright Law: A Commentary (Edward Elgar Publishing 2014). 
113 Irini Stamatoudi, “The Enforcement Directive” in Irini Stamatoudi and Paul Torremans (eds.) EU Copyright 
Law: A Commentary (Edward Elgar Publishing 2014). 
114 Darius Adamski, “Lost on the digital platform: Europe’s legal travails with the digital single market” [2018] 
55 CML Rev. 719, 728 – 729. 
115 Daphne Keller, “The Right Tools: Europe's Intermediary Liability Laws and the EU 2016 General Data 
Protection Regulation” (2018) 33 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 287, 295. 
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copyright directive, is the provisions laid out in Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive, which 
states as follows: 
” Where an information society service is provided that consists of the storage of information 
provided by a recipient of the service, Member States shall ensure that the service provider is not 
liable for the information stored at the request of a recipient of the service, on condition that: 
(a) the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or information and, as regards 
claims for damages, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or 
information is apparent; or 
(b) the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or 
to disable access to the information.” 
Article 14 paragraph 1 of the E-Commerce Directive provides that the intermediary service 
providers must act to disable access to the infringing material only after gaining knowledge of 
the existence of said material. Thus, the requirement for the intermediaries to act has in so far 
been mostly reactionary, meaning that they are not expected to actively monitor or seek illegal 
activity within their platforms, instead acting on a case-by-case basis after notification from the 
right-holder. This system is also known as the “notice and takedown” procedure.116 
The liability regime of the intermediary seems to be considerably stricter according to Article 
17 of the new Directive. First, Article 17 of the Directive deprives the online content sharing 
providers of the safety provided by Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive. Article 17(4) lays 
out new obligations for these online content sharing providers in a following fashion: 
“If no authorisation is granted, online content-sharing service providers shall be liable for 
unauthorised acts of communication to the public, including making available to the public, of 
copyright-protected works and other subject matter, unless the service providers demonstrate that 
they have:  
(a) made best efforts to obtain an authorisation, and  
(b) made, in accordance with high industry standards of professional diligence, best efforts to 
ensure the unavailability of specific works and other subject matter for which the rightholders 
have provided the service providers with the relevant and necessary information; and in any event  
(c) acted expeditiously, upon receiving a sufficiently substantiated notice from the rightholders, 
to disable access to, or to remove from their websites, the notified works or other subject matter, 
and made best efforts to prevent their future uploads in accordance with point (b).” 
                                                 
116 Giancarlo F. Frosio, “Reforming Intermediary Liability in the Platform Economy: A European Digital Single 
Market Strategy” (2017) 112 Nw. U. L. Rev. Online 18, 20; 41. 
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Firstly, the intermediaries acting as online content sharing service providers, in order to escape 
liability, should have made “best efforts” to obtain an authorization from the copyright holder 
regarding the potentially copyright infringing material. More precisely and according to the 
demands of the Directive, this authorization should be obtained via a licensing agreement 
between the intermediary and the right-holder117. Considering the dumbfounding amount of 
copyright protected material being uploaded to platforms such as YouTube on a daily basis, 
this is undoubtedly an impossible feat, which consequently puts more emphasis on the second 
and third requirement set for the intermediaries. 
Secondly, the Directive demands that the intermediaries, with their best efforts, “ensure the 
unavailability” of copyright protected material (Article 17(b)) while similarly removing and 
ensuring the unavailability of the material they have been notified by the right-holders (Article 
17 (c)). It is important to note that there aren’t specific requirements of general monitoring or 
use of upload filtering technologies set for the intermediaries. In fact, paragraph 6 of the 
Directive explicitly explains that the “application of the provisions shall not lead to any general 
monitoring obligation”. 
Regarding the role of an online intermediary or more specifically that of an online content 
sharing provider, a fundamental shift seems to have occurred in the liability of the service 
provider. In general terms, the shift has mostly happened with the type of activity that is 
required from the service provider. Whereas in the Article 14 of the E-commerce Directive the 
liability is based on the awareness of infringing material, Article 17 of the new copyright 
directive demands a more proactive approach. The service provider must now, unlike before, 
try to obtain an authorization from the right holder, and failing that, otherwise try and ensure 
the unavailability of copyright protected material on their platform. 
Next, we are going to look at the EU-case law that perhaps assists in understanding the rather 
drastic changes that have occurred between the adoption of the earlier directives and the 
copyright Directive. In addition to cases that have the element of involvement of an online 
intermediary, we are going to look at those important IP-cases that do not possess such element 
to get a clearer picture of the position of the CJEU and ECtHR regarding intellectual property 
in general. Despite the lack of CJEU-level judgments having to do with the liability of online 
                                                 
117 Directive 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council on copyright in the Digital Single Market” 
COM (2018) Art. 17 (2). 
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intermediaries until 2008, the period between the adoption of the first set of copyright related 
directives and the first CJEU-ruling was congested with Member State-level judgments that 
were in favor of the right holders in expense of the intermediaries118. 
3.4 The changing position of an online intermediary and the development of IP-protection 
in the European landscape 
Regarding the framework in which the balancing between intellectual property rights occurs 
there are three distinguishable changes that have happened during the last decade or so. Firstly, 
the way in which the Court conducts the balancing exercise has become more thorough. 
Secondly, intermediaries haven been the target of increasingly strict measures. Thirdly, the 
importance of intellectual property seems to have grown significantly, and the change has been 
mainly driven by cases where the Court has weighed IP-interests against data privacy rights, 
which have traditionally been strongly protected by the Union. Next, we are going to look at 
these changes in more detail. 
3.4.1 The development of the balancing exercise concerning IP-rights 
A CJEU-level judgement directly related to the new copyright directives, specifically the 
InfoSoc Directive, is the judgement of Laserdisken119 from 2006. In this case the claimant, 
Laserdisken, argued that Article 4(2) of the InfoSoc Directive is invalid as it restricts, among 
other things, freedom of information. The article in question concerned the exclusion of the 
international exhaustion principle within the Community, and because of this provision, 
Laserdisken was unable to import without prior consent from the copyright owners. The CJEU 
in its judgement stated rather straightforwardly that this restriction on the freedom to receive 
information was justified because of the need to protect the right to property120. 
                                                 
118 See for example: Case IZR304/01, Rolex v Ricardo, The German Federal Court of Justice, 11 March 2004;  
Sabam and IFPI v Seniorennet, Court of Antwerp 5 October 2006; Lafesse v Myspace, Civil Court of Paris, 22 
June 2007; Nord-Ouest Production v S.A. DailyMotion and S.A. UGC Images, Civil Court of Paris, 13 July 2007. 
For further discussion, see Patrick van Eecke, “Online service providers and liability: A plea for a balanced 
approach” (2011) 48 CML Rev. 1455, 1459 – 1462. 
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For example Mylly has rather dramatically stated that the period starting from the rulings 
establishing the fundamental status of IP-rights all the way to the Laserdisken-ruling has been 
characterized by rejection and ignorance of other fundamental rights for the benefit of IP-
rights121and gone as far as suggesting that fundamental rights were consciously interpreted so 
as not to challenge secondary IP-law of the Union122. Some authors such as Oliver and Stothers 
have pointed out that seminal judgments in the line of BAT123 prove otherwise, and the situation 
has perhaps not been as dire as Mylly has suggested124. Whatever the case, the balancing 
exercise conducted by the Court had still been lackluster to say the least. 
The turn of tides regarding the Courts stance towards the balancing exercise when IP/rights 
were on the line can be seen to have happened in Promusicae. In the case, Promusicae, who 
were representing the right holders of musical and audiovisual recordings, demanded that 
Telefónica, an internet access provider, must release the personal information of an end-user 
who was allegedly behind infringements of copyright. The demand was based on the Data 
Retention Directive125, which has been more thoroughly discussed above. ECJ decided against 
Promusicae and argued that the original purpose of the Data Retention Directive was to assist 
in the battle against serious crime, and data gathered on the basis of the directive could not be 
used in a civil lawsuit unless the Member State legislator chose to act towards such goal. Even 
then, the Member State should “allow a fair balance to be struck” between the competing 
fundamental rights.126 This reasoning was reaffirmed a year later in Tele2127. 
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123 Case C-491/01 British American Tobacco (Investments) Limited and Imperial Tobacco Limited v Secretary of 
State for Health EU:C: 2002:741. It may be fair towards Mylly to point out that the preliminary ruling given by 
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The Promusicae-case is important for IP-rights for three main reasons. First, it can be argued 
that despite earlier rulings, this case was the jumpstart for constitutional value of IP and its 
effective protection becoming “mainstream” within the Union legal order128. Second, it set the 
precedent of demanding Member State to always find the fair balance with other rights when 
enforcing IP-rights129. Third, while striving for this fair balance, the Member States must act 
within the boundaries set by the Union, that is, finding the balance between different human 
rights is primarily the task of the Union130. 
After Promusicae there have been numerous cases in which the balancing exercise concerning 
intellectual property and other fundamental rights has become more thorough. These include 
the SABAM-cases, L’Oréal v. eBay131, Telekabel132 and McFadden133, in which the Court has 
given some ideas of what means taken by an intermediary can be considered achieving a fair 
balance. These cases are going to be more thoroughly examined later in this chapter as well as 
subsequent chapters. 
3.4.2 Stricter requirements for the intermediaries 
The last decade after coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty has been by far the busiest 
regarding the number of cases relating to IP-law both on the Union and a Member State level. 
The coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the consequent primary law status of the Charter 
is undoubtedly one factor in this development, however, it isn’t the most significant one. The 
fundamental status of IP-rights was evidently recognized before this further elevation of its 
status in numerous cases, some of which have been discussed above. Instead, the unprecedented 
technological developments of the last decade in fields such as e-commerce, cloud-based 
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129 Tatiana-Eleni Synodinou, “Intermediaries' liability for online copyright infringement in the EU: Evolutions and 
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130 van Eecke (n 120) 1494 – 1495. 
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streaming services and social media have been the prominent driving-force behind IP rights 
taking a central role in the case law of the Union. 
Considering the growing element of third-party involvement in these new technologies, it is 
only natural that the most influential developments in the status of IP-rights have also occurred 
in cases where the role of the service provider in an alleged copyright infringement is a focal 
point in the judgement. One of these cases is the 2011 judgement of Scarlet Extended134, which 
had implications on both the broader spectrum of the IP-rights and in the liability of the 
intermediaries. In the case, a collective society, SABAM, demanded that Scarlet, an internet 
service provider, would put in place filtering mechanisms in order to prevent the copyright 
infringement towards the members of SABAM. These violations happened because of peer-to-
peer file sharing of music committed by the users of Scarlet’s internet service. 
CJEU rejected the claims of SABAM. What is important regarding the fundamental status of 
IP-rights, the Court declared that nothing in the wording of the Article 17(2) of the Charter or 
earlier case law suggests that the right to intellectual property is inviolable and hence absolutely 
protected135. Consequently, and in line with Promusicae, the Court demanded that a fair balance 
must be struck between IP and other fundamental rights136. What is important for both the 
fundamental status of IP-rights and the position of the service provider, the Court stated that a 
monitoring obligation with no clear temporal or other limitations is too expansive when the 
fundamental rights of freedom to conduct a business, right to data protection and freedom of 
information are taken into consideration137. The Court saw the monitoring obligation as so 
unproportioned that in this preliminary ruling it did not give the Member State any discretion 
for striking a fair balance unlike in Promusicae138, but took upon itself to give a clear and firm 
statement regarding the matter. In 2012 the ruling of CJEU in the Netlog139 case confirmed the 
position of the Court adopted in Scarlet, however, this time in the context of a social media 
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platform. That is, general monitoring obligations set for the intermediary are not in most cases 
striking a fair balance as they are against Article 15 of the Enforcement Directive.140 
A judgement of similar qualities from the same year is the case of L’Oréal v. eBay141, with the 
main differences being that instead of a copyright dispute against an internet service provider 
the case was about the role of an auction service provider in a trademark violation. In this case, 
in which the claimant argued that eBay was liable for the trademark infringements of its users 
by failing to act accordingly and financially benefitting from each transaction happening in its 
site, the Court decided in the claimant’s favor. ECJ did affirm once again that any general 
monitoring obligations for the hosting provider were prohibited, as they would automatically 
go against the provisions set in the Enforcement Directive which demands proportionality from 
possible measures to be taken by the intermediary142. However, the Court continued, measures 
that are proportionate, as identifying trading partners, can be demanded by the way of an 
injunction143. Furthermore, the Court stated that Article 14(1) of the E-Commerce Directive 
does not allow the intermediary to be passive even without the existence of the injured party’s 
specific notice, as knowledge of a possible infringement can also be obtained through an 
investigation made by the service provider on its own initiative144. In other words, the hosting 
provider cannot rely on Article 14 (1) of the E-Commerce Directive, which exempts the hosting 
provider from liability if it “does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity” by being 
completely passive with regards to achieving awareness of these activities145. 
The lines of cases from Scarlet and L’Oréal to Netlog seems to be indicative of the first steps 
towards the position of the Court of a more active role of the online intermediary by rejecting 
the possibility of complete passivity on behalf of the intermediary. As such, this line of cases 
seems to be the first phase in moving from the requirements set by the first batch of copyright 
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directives towards the current regime. The Court took this stance a step further in 2014 
Telekabel where it found that it was indeed plausible for the right-holder to demand a specific 
end-result from the service provider146. Thus, the CJEU argued, it was not directly against the 
goals of fair balance for the national Court to issue an injunction towards Telekabel to block 
access to a website containing infringing material when the injunction does not specify the exact 
measures to be taken to reach the desired end-result. Furthermore, the measures must not be too 
restrictive towards accessing information regarding the end-users and they must be efficient in 
a way that they discourage or sufficiently hamper the efforts of possible copyright infringers147.  
Some parallels with the Telekabel judgement can be drawn with the ECtHR decision of Delfi148, 
which was given by the Grand Chamber in 2015. In this case ECtHR decided that Delfi, an 
online news portal, could be held liable for third party comments made by the users of the 
portal, even if Delfi acted upon requests of takedown regarding the comments and did not 
possess prior knowledge of the said comments. This was the first judgement of ECtHR 
regarding the liability of an online intermediary149 and the case did not concern a copyright 
issue, however, the nature of the liability described by ECtHR seemed to have similarities to 
those presented in the Telekabel-case. In particular, ECtHR’s indirect requirement imposing 
active monitoring obligations to Delfi150 seems to fall in line with the interpretation of CJEU in 
Telekabel and L’Oréal v. eBay, which hint at a more proactive role of the intermediary regarding 
preventing copyright infringements from occurring, even if imposing monitoring obligations 
for online intermediaries is forbidden within the Union legal order per se151. 
The 2016 case of McFadden152 also seemed to set new requirements for an intermediary. The 
case was brought before CJEU for a preliminary ruling when a provider of a Wi-Fi-service 
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network, Mr. McFadden, refused to secure his Wi-Fi-hotspot with a password following the 
claim by Sony Music Germany that the Wi-Fi-network had been used to infringe the right-
holders copyright. First of the significant statements given by the Court was that an individual 
operating Wi-Fi-hotspot service provider could be regarded as an intermediary with the 
meaning given in Article 12(1) of the E-Commerce Directive153, thus broadening the concept 
of online intermediary within the Union legal order. Secondly, it developed the concept of 
indirect liability of website intermediaries, meaning that the operators are indirectly liable of 
the infringing content shared by their users and can thus be sued for damages by the right-
holders under Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive154. The concept of indirect liability 
concerning the website operators was later affirmed in The Pirate Bay155 case, in which two 
ISPs were requested to block entry to The Pirate Bay website, infamous for its torrenting 
activities156. 
3.4.3 The strengthening position of IP-rights 
After coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty there have been cases that have seemingly both 
strengthened and weakened the position of IP-rights. One example of a pro-IP-rights ruling was 
the case of Luksan157in which a national measure restricting ownership of IP-rights was seen 
breaching Article 17(2) of the Charter158. The case was the first of its kind in the sense that not 
before had the existence and ownership of IP-rights been considered in relation to fundamental 
rights159. The judgement also implicated that a Member State departing from the CJEU 
interpretation of copyright norms is a fundamental rights breach, if this departure results in 
unfavourable outcome for the right-holder160. If this ruling seemed to be grossly in favor of IP-
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rights, the contrary can be said occurring in Sky Österreich161, the judgement of which came 
the following year. Here, the result for the right holder was surprisingly rough, as CJEU did not 
consider an exclusive broadcasting right acquired via a licensing agreement by Sky Österreich 
“an established legal position”162 which is a prerequisite for the applicability of a fundamental 
right to property163. 
However, the most obvious steps towards the strengthening of intellectual property as a 
fundamental right were taken in cases having the presence of an intermediary. In Bonnier 
Audio164, the CJEU continued its arguments in line with the cases of Promusicae and Tele2. 
Thus, it is not completely forbidden for Member States to give an obligation for the 
intermediaries to reveal personal data of alleged infringers in civil proceedings, provided that 
such obligations manage to strike a fair balance with other rights165. The Court did, however, 
give a bit more information of the ways such balancing exercise could be conducted166.  
In 2017, the CJEU changed its position established in Promusicae in the judgement of Coty 
Germany167. In the case, Coty requested a German bank to release information regarding the 
owner of a bank account, which had been used by the owner to receive funds originating from 
the sale of a counterfeit product, the trademark of which was owned by Coty. As Husovec points 
out, the facts of the case were very similar to those of Promusicae, with the main differences 
being that the requestee for the personal information of the infringer was a bank, the type of the 
infringement was that of trademark instead of copyright and, unlike during the judgment of 
Promusicae, the Charter was legally binding168. 
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Despite these similarities, the CJEU arrived in a stricter conclusion than in Promusicae. After 
Promusicae, the stance of the Court was that there was no requirement for Member States to 
have in place an obligation that ensures the communication of personal data to the right-holders 
in a civil proceeding in order to protect IP-rights169. However, after Coty Germany, the new 
stand is that such obligation must be in place, and moreover, the absence of such obligation 
may constitute a fundamental rights breach towards the right to intellectual property170. Thus, 
the line of cases ranging from Promusicae, Tele 2 and Bonnier Audio to the strict ruling of Coty 
Germany seems to indicate a more general strengthening of intellectual property rights, as 
traditionally strong data protection and privacy had to give way for the enforcement of IP-rights.  
3.5 Conclusions on the development of intellectual property as a fundamental right in EU 
Intellectual property as a fundamental right has taken the center stage in the fundamental right 
discussion of the Union in a relatively short time. Despite the brevity of this journey, it has been 
filled with many important developments which have in some instances seemed confusing or 
even contradictory. Nevertheless, there are some patterns visible regarding the CJEUs position 
towards fundamental rights in general and more specifically, the role of intermediaries within 
this framework. 
First, the Court has never found the right to intellectual property, or property in general for that 
matter, to be absolute in nature. This has been clear since the “social function” relating to IP-
rights established in Metronome Musik, and the development has continued with the more 
sophisticated concept of fair balance from Promusicae all the way to Sky Österreich and 
McFadden. The Court has taken up the task of more clearly determining how to achieve this 
fair balance between different fundamental rights, rather than completely leaving it to the 
discretion of the national courts. 
Secondly, it is contestable whether the position of IP as a fundamental right has strengthened 
vis-à-vis other fundamental rights, as during the last 15 years or so there have been seminal 
cases both for and against the right-holders as in the judgements of Luksan and Sky Österreich. 
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What seems to be indisputably clear, however, is that the position of the online intermediaries 
and service providers in terms of liability for third party infringements has become considerably 
stricter. This can be seen from the line of cases ranging from Scarlet and Netlog to Telekabel 
where the CJEU has seemingly considered more and more stringent actions demanded by the 
right-holders to be taken by the intermediary to fall within the grey area of fair balance.  
Furthermore, the line of cases from Promusicae, Tele2 and Bonnier Audio to Coty Germany 
showcase that Member States, unlike earlier, must now have in place an obligation for the 
intermediaries to release personal data of the claimed infringers for the right-holders in civil-
proceedings. This seems to indicate that the position of IP-rights as a fundamental right has 
indeed become stronger. Even the right to personal data, which have been famously protected 
in Schrems and Digital Rights Ireland, has had to give some leeway for the right-to property. 
Moreover, the McFadden decision broadened the concept of “online intermediary” of Article 
12(1) of the E-Commerce Directive and the judgement together with the ruling of The Pirate 
Bay affirmed the indirect liability of the online service provider. 
It is visible from the continuum of the case law concerning IP-infringements that CJEU has 
desperately attempted to keep up with the rapidly changing technological environment and the 
increased involvement of the intermediaries within the limits allowed by copyright-related 
directives legislated in the early 2000’s. With this is mind, it is no surprise that the legislator 
recognized the need for the updating of the copyright-regime as a part of the Digital Single 
Market -strategy. Many of the positions assumed by the Court can also be seen influencing 
Article 17 of the new copyright directive. For example, CJEU evidently tried to alleviate the 
problems caused by the somewhat passive position of the hosting service provider granted by 
Article 14(1) of the E-Commerce Directive in Telekabel and McFadden. This position of the 
Court has in some form found its way into Article 17(3) of the Directive in the context of online 
content sharing service providers, which states:  
 ”When an online content-sharing service provider performs an act of communication to the 
public or an act of making available to the public under the conditions laid down in this Directive, 
the limitation of liability established in Article 14(1) of Directive 2000/31/EC shall not apply to 
the situations covered by this Article.” 
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Moreover, the preconditions that the content-sharing service providers must fulfill to be 
exempted from liability presented in Article 17(4) of the Directive171 seem to echo the stance 
of the Court concerning the more active role of the online intermediaries. However, monitoring 
obligations per se are still not demanded from the online-content sharing service providers in 
the Directive. 
Given the developments described in the discussion above, the stricter position assumed by the 
legislator towards the liability of online-content sharing service providers can hardly be seen as 
an enormous surprise. What cannot be concluded from this discussion, however, whether the 
provisions of the Directive follow from the “fair balance” set by the Court between specific 
fundamental rights. Thus, we are next going to look at the relationship between individual 
fundamental rights and the right to intellectual property. As already discussed above, we are 
going to focus on the two rights that are most probably influenced by the directive. These rights 
are the freedom of expression and information and freedom to conduct a business. 
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4 THE FAIR BALANCE BETWEEN THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND 
INFORMATION AND THE RIGHT TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we are first going to introduce the freedom of expression and information as a 
general concept in the European framework. After this, we are going to look at cases from 
ECtHR and CJEU where the relevant rights are being balanced. From this examination, certain 
things can be concluded. First, the right to information as a fundamental right has considerably 
strengthened through the years. Related to this point, the lawful access to information has 
gained ground as a significant aspect when considering the proportionality of a measure 
protecting the right to intellectual property. Lastly, the balancing act taken by CJEU with 
regarding the freedom of expression and the right to intellectual property may be undergoing a 
change. All these aspects together may have influence on the application of Article 17 of the 
new copyright directive. 
Like the right to intellectual property, the freedom of expression and information as a 
fundamental right is protected by multiple international and European conventions, and the 
right has a long tradition in all parliamentary democracies of Europe172. The right is protected, 
among others, in Article 19(2) of ICCPR173 and Article 10 ECHR, which grants the freedom 
“to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by 
authorities and regardless of frontiers174”. In the legislative framework of the Union the most 
crucial provision that gives the freedom of expression and information the status of a 
fundamental right is naturally Article 11 of the Charter, which states as follows: 
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority 
and regardless of frontiers.  
2. The freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected.” 
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The vast majority of fundamental rights are not absolute, however, and the freedom of 
expression and information is no exception in this regard. The contents of Article 19(2) of 
ICCPR and Article 10(2) of ECHR concerning these limitations have much in common, as both 
provisions state that the right can be subject to restrictions, among other things, for the 
protection of rights of others if these restrictions are provided by law and necessary175. As with 
most rights within the Charter, Article 11 does not contain specific limitations relating to the 
freedom of expression and information. However, the provision is subject to the general 
limitation regime set by Article 52(1) which demands that the limitations are proportional, 
necessary, and “meet the objectives of general interest”176. 
Within the legal framework of the Union, the balancing of freedom of expression to that of 
intellectual property has traditionally been done entirely through the exceptions and limitations 
set in Article 5 of the InfoSoc Directive177. Unlike in United States, there is no fair use doctrine 
available in the EU. The fair use system present in the US is flexible by nature, as it only 
provides the framework in which courts can operate rather freely. That is, American courts 
possess a great deal of discretion when contemplating on the fairness of the use of copyright 
protected material178. The possible introduction of a European fair use regime into the 
fundamental right -framework of the Union has in the past met strong resistance, because 
despite its flexibility, many see it affecting negatively regarding the predictability and 
harmonization of the legislation179. 
What is important to notice in this regard is that, unlike ECtHR, CJEU has not so far recognized 
the existence of an external balancing act concerning the fair balancing of freedom of 
expression and intellectual property and has relied on the internal system of limitations and 
exceptions to copyright180. This does not, however, mean that there hasn’t been a proper 
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balancing between the two rights in the case law of the Union. CJEU has in the past initiated 
the balancing exercise on two different grounds. First, the CJEU has increasingly started to 
interpret many of the exceptions and limitations as underlying “rights” which has made the 
balancing exercise possible181. These actions by the Court have consequently extended the 
scope of the exceptions and limitations, as they are now interpreted in a more lenient way182. 
Secondly, CJEU has strived to balance the scales by taking into account the rights of the users 
as of equal value183. The balancing exercise in the latter situation is usually related to an 
enforcement of a specific measure that has effect on other fundamental rights and has to do with 
the intermediaries rather than the infringing parties per se184. 
Thus, within the EU legal landscape, the freedom of expression and information can to a certain 
extent be limited to protect the interests of the intellectual property right-holders and vice versa. 
What complicates the assessing of fair balance between these fundamental rights in an online 
environment is the fact that strengthening the position of freedom of expression via 
communication networks is one of the long term strategic objectives of the Union185, and it is 
safe to say that the stricter obligations set in Article 17 for an online content-sharing service 
provider do not help in achieving these goals. When contemplating on the continuity or lack 
thereof of the previous fair balance set by the legislator and the Court with the demands set by 
Article 17, it is important to recall that the “fair balance” between these rights does not exist in 
a void unaffected by the fluctuating strategic paradigms of the Union. 
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In addition to the potential conflicts of internal policies of the Union, finding the fair balance 
between the freedom of expression and the right to intellectual property in the context of online 
intermediaries is further complicated by the fact that the current reign of “notice-and-takedown” 
regime of liability of the intermediaries is not European by nature. The roots of the system 
firmly reside in the United States, which established the safe harbor of online intermediaries 
that has heavily inspired the relevant liability provisions in the EU186. Therefore, any deviations 
from this already foreign area of liability will undoubtedly amount to a challenge of navigating 
in a previously uncharted territory. 
This chapter is divided into three parts. First, we are going to look at the case law of CJEU and 
ECtHR relating to cases where the freedom of expression and right to intellectual property has 
raised a discussion on the fair balance of the two rights in a situation where there is no 
involvement of a third party, and try to determine some more general guidelines that can be 
recognized from these judgements without needing to focus on the role of the online 
intermediary. After this, we are going to focus on those decisions that concern specifically the 
issue of freedom of expression in cases where there is a presence of an intermediary. This 
division also more or less follows the aforementioned two different grounds for the balancing 
exercise established by the CJEU with the exceptions of the couple of cases from ECtHR, where 
the balancing is based on the external protection of freedom of expression. In the last part, the 
paper strives to offer some concluding remarks on the issue specifically taking into account the 
demands set for the intermediary in Article 17 of the Directive. 
4.2 Freedom of expression and intellectual property – the balancing exercise in cases 
without the involvement of an online intermediary 
A case that started, albeit shakily, the balancing exercise between the rights of freedom of 
expression and information and the right to intellectual property is the already presented case 
of Laserdisken187, which concerned the exclusion of the international exhaustion principle 
within the Community caused by Article 4(2) of the InfoSoc Directive.  Even though the extent 
of this so-called balancing conducted by the Court can be heavily criticized, the fact that both 
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freedom of expression and freedom of information were considered separately might offer some 
tidbits of information regarding the line of thinking of the CJEU.  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the publics’ right to information was bypassed 
straightforwardly by the Court which simply stated that the restriction on freedom of 
information caused by the InfoSoc Directive is justifiable in order to protect IP-rights188. The 
relevant Article 4(2) of the InfoSoc Directive gave more control of the distribution of copyright 
protected material to the right-holders in expense of the right to information, provided that this 
restriction on freedom of information was justified by interests of the public, motivated by 
legitimate aims and “necessary in a democratic society”189. 
Regarding the freedom of expression aspect of the judgement, the Court was a little more 
generous with its arguments. Laserdisken had argued that the freedom of expression governed 
by Article 10 of ECHR was breached, as the right to distribution was exhausted by the first sale 
the copyright holder was made, and thus the right-holders could no longer freely express their 
ideas. The Court dismissed this claim by stating that the right-holder continues to have full 
power over this first sale and thus over the access to market, and hence there is no breach of 
Article 10 ECHR190.  
The first proper ruling of ECtHR on the balancing of freedom of expression and information 
and right to intellectual property seemed to rely on arguments similar to those used by CJEU in 
Laserdisken regarding the “balancing” of freedom of information and IP-rights. The case in 
question is Ashby Donald191, which was about fashion photographers that were sentenced to 
pay fines by the French national court after a copyright infringement. The photographers had 
published the photographs on a website without the permission of the fashion houses, which 
had organized the fashion shows the pictures were taken in. The photographers consequently 
argued before ECtHR that their freedom of expression had been breached. 
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ECtHR agreed that the conviction and subsequent damages suffered by the photographers were 
indeed an interference with their freedom of expression protected in Article 10 of ECHR192. 
However, the interference fulfilled the conditions set by Article 10(2) of ECHR in that it was 
provided by law, strived legitimately to protect the rights of others and was necessary in a 
democratic society193. These were more or less the same arguments that were used by CJEU a 
couple of years earlier. However, ECtHR gave some more information about its balancing 
exercise by stating that the commercial nature of the published photographs was a major reason 
why the IP-rights had to be seen as a prevailing right194. Were the purpose of the publishing for 
example political, the outcome might have been different.  
It is also noteworthy that, as already alluded to in the introduction of this chapter, ECtHR unlike 
CJEU recognizes the external importance of the freedom of expression as a fundamental right 
instead of indirectly deriving it internally from the exceptions and limitations of copyright. This 
stance of ECtHR was also affirmed in the Pirate Bay195-case of the same year. In the case, two 
of the founders of the Pirate Bay-website, notorious for its activities relating to torrenting, 
claimed that the freedom of expression and information under Article 10 ECtHR were violated 
because of the conviction for crimes in violation of the Swedish Copyright Act196. ECtHR found 
that the Swedish copyright regulation did indeed infringe the Article 10 as it resulted in the 
liability of the co-founders of a website which facilitated the imparting and receiving of 
information for its users197. Nevertheless, ECtHR found the balance to be fair regarding the 
conviction of the national court, as it reasoned that the interference with Article 10 was justified 
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in order to protect the intellectual property rights198. The application was therefore rejected with 
arguments largely similar to those presented in Ashby Donald199. 
Furthermore, ECtHR refers to the indictment and damages suffered by the applicants as 
restrictions on the freedom of expression. This is a fundamentally different approach than the 
one assumed by CJEU and the Copyright Directive, both of which see the copyright as a general 
principle and the aspects of freedom of expression as an exception.200 
Regarding cases where there isn’t an involvement of intermediary, some wisdom concerning 
the fair balance between freedom of expression and intellectual property may also be found in 
the CJEU case of Sky Österreich201. In this case, an Austrian media service authority gave an 
Austrian public broadcaster the right to use coverage of Sky Sports in short highlight-excerpts. 
Sky had the exclusive right to the broadcasting, however, Directive 2007/65202 required that 
exclusive broadcasters must provide public broadcasters broadcasting material for short reports 
without requiring them reimbursement that exceeds the cost of providing the signal. 
Consequently, Sky Österreich challenged this provision being against its freedom to conduct a 
business and the right to property. As explained in the previous chapter, CJEU didn’t recognize 
the breach of Article 17 and right to property of the Charter and thus only considered the fair 
balance between freedom to conduct a business and freedom to expression and information. 
However, the arguments of the Court regarding this fair balance are essentially identical to those 
of Advocate General Bot, who considered the fair balance between both Article 16 and 17 of 
the Charter and the freedom of expression.  
Like the Court, AG Bot recognized the significance of the broadcasted material in terms of 
information to the public, as opposed to only considering the entertainment value of the 
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report203. Building from here, AG Bot extensively considered both the necessity and 
proportionality of the relevant provision in Directive 2007/65 and concluded that a fair balance 
between the right to freedom of expression and information and Articles 16 and 17 of the 
Charter had been achieved by the directive204. Firstly, regarding the necessity of the measure, 
both the Court and AG Bot agreed that less restrictive measures than the one prescribed in the 
directive would lead to higher costs demanded by the exclusive broadcaster, which in turn may 
effectively deprive the public broadcasters of their ability to offer the highlight-reports, thus not 
achieving the goals relating to information set by the relevant article of the directive205. 
Secondly, regarding the proportionality of the measure, both the Court and AG Bot agreed that 
the limited financial burden occurring for the exclusive broadcaster, the limited nature of the 
short extracts used and possible publicity benefits enjoyed by the exclusive broadcaster all 
amount to a proportionate restriction, and thus a fair balance between the rights in question206. 
Given the similarity of the of the arguments used by the Court and AG Bot, the interlinked 
nature of Articles 16 and 17 of the Charter207 coupled with the curious way the Court 
disregarded the claims of the applicant concerning its right to property it is difficult not to 
ponder whether the Court consciously bypassed the claims concerning the right to property in 
order to avoid a direct balancing exercise between the freedom of intellectual property and 
freedom of information. Instead, it chose to focus on the right to conduct a business, which is a 
right perhaps more easily constrained. Of course, it is useful to point out that in theory there 
was indeed no need for the Court to conduct this balancing exercise, as this restriction on the 
freedom to conduct a business was already present as per Directive 2007/65. However, nothing 
would have prevented the Court from assessing the necessity and proportionality of the 
Directive 2007/65 similarly to AG Bot. 
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Even though the rejection of Article 17 of the Charter in this case at first glance seems like the 
balance would have been in the favor of freedom of information, based on a closer scrutiny, it 
is difficult to look at it this way. Rather, it seems that the Court has perhaps avoided the 
question, and it cannot thus be seen contradicting the provisions of Article 17 of the Directive, 
where copyright is perhaps protected in the expense of the right to information. 
A case where the fair balance between freedom of expression and right to intellectual property 
was recognized more clearly by the CJEU was Deckmyn208 later in the same year. In this case 
Mr. Deckmyn, the member of an openly racist Flemish party had edited and published an 
equally racist calendar, which was based on the works a famous Belgian comic-book artist, Mr. 
Vandersteen. The case landed before CJEU, as the Belgian court sought guidance on the 
meaning of the term “parody”. 
Whether or not the work of Mr. Deckmyn could be considered parody is irrelevant for the 
purpose of this paper. What is relevant, however, is the fact that the Court underlined the task 
of the national courts in balancing the rights of the original author and the user of his works, 
and directly emphasized the fair balance between the right to property of the former and the 
freedom of expression of the latter209. Even though the Court did not give any insight into how 
this balancing exercise should be conducted in practice, it did confirm that parody as an 
exception to copyright as meant in Article 5(3)(k) of the InfoSoc Directive is to be interpreted 
as a proper way of expressing an opinion210. Freedom of expression can thus be recognized as 
an underlining right relating to parody211. Therefore the discussion relating to parody as an 
exception seems to always lead to a discussion about the balance between freedom of 
expression and IP as a fundamental right, as the interests of the right-holders are to be balanced 
against the right to freedom of expression of the users of the protected work rather than against 
the exception for parody212.  
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Parody isn’t the only exception or limitation to intellectual property that has caused the “fair 
balance” between freedom of expression and IP-rights to be considered by the Court. The earlier 
Painer213-case concerned a quotation exception also covered by Article 5 of the InfoSoc 
Directive. Even though the Court in this case chose to defend the rights of the IP-owner214, the 
fact that different types of exceptions and limitations to copyright have been seen first and 
foremost representing freedom of expression by CJEU seems to indicate that the Court is not 
afraid to pose restrictions to IP-rights via these instruments in the name of fair balance. This 
argument is reinforced by the Courts assessment in Deckmyn, which recognized the term 
“parody” as a concept which must be broad enough for the exception to be effective215 rather 
than viewing it as a narrow term in order to avoid a clash with the rights of the IP-holder. The 
judgements in Painer and Deckmyn can hence be seen indicating a change in the way the Court 
looks at the exceptions to copyright, at least when looking at some of the earlier decisions such 
as Laserdisken. This shift might prove to be significant for Article 17 of the Directive. 
4.3 Freedom of expression and intellectual property – the balancing exercise in cases with 
the involvement of an online intermediary 
A case that started the balancing exercise in situations where there is an involvement of an 
intermediary is Promusicae216, in which a music industry representative demanded that an 
internet access provider releases information of an alleged copyright infringer. However, this 
case did not try to find a fair balance between the fundamental rights of freedom of expression 
and intellectual property. Nevertheless, regarding the balancing, the case did seem to convey a 
more pivotal role of the Union in determining this fair balance and established the 
proportionality as a tool that is used in this evaluation in practice217. Given the importance of 
the ruling and especially the fair balance exercises conducted in later decision of CJEU, it is 
safe to say that the involvement of an intermediary has been a crucial element in the 
development of the fair balance between freedom of expression and intellectual property. This 
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is evident in the larger number of case law dealing with the fair balance in the situation where 
there is an intermediary involvement as opposed to those where there is no such involvement. 
Scarlet Extended218was the first case involving an online intermediary where the balance 
between the two rights in question was touched upon by the CJEU. The facts of the case were 
to do with a collective society demanding an internet service provider to install filtering 
mechanisms in order to avoid copyright violations. Even though majority of the arguments 
presented by the Court were to do with personal data issues and those relating to freedom to 
conduct a business, the Court also mentioned the significance a possible injunction could have 
on freedom of information: 
” -- injunction could potentially undermine freedom of information since that system might not 
distinguish adequately between unlawful content and lawful content, with the result that its 
introduction could lead to the blocking of lawful communications.”219 
The Court then continued to determine that the filtering system proposed by SABAM does not 
fulfill the fair balance requirement220. It is visible from the wording of the Court that it is the 
broadness of the filtering mechanisms that causes the problems regarding the fair balance, as a 
system that encompasses all users and an unlimited time-period cannot be considered 
proportional221. Similar demands concerning filtering mechanisms were made by SABAM in 
the Netlog222-case, and regarding the freedom of information, they were turned down by the 
Court with arguments identical to those in Scarlet. What is perhaps useful to remember, 
however, is that despite the Court denying the filtering mechanisms suggested by SABAM due 
to them leading to an unproportioned outcome, it does not mean that less restricting filtering 
mechanisms would necessarily be struck down by the Court223. Therefore, the lack of specific 
prohibition of filtering mechanisms in Article 17 of the Directive is hardly surprising. 
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The next case of CJEU focusing on the relationship between freedom of information and right 
to property was the Telekabel224-case, in which an internet service provider UPC Telekabel 
Wien was being pressured to block the access to a website in which films owned by the 
copyright-owner were being made available. The Austrian court requested a preliminary 
reference asking, among other things, whether such an injunction was compatible with the fair 
balance of the fundamental rights of the parties in question. 
The Court recognized potential conflicts with multiple fundamental rights of the Charter 
regarding the unlimited exercise of such an injunction225, however, regarding the freedom of 
information it stated followingly: 
”None the less, when the addressee of an injunction such as that at issue in the main proceedings 
chooses the measures to be adopted in order to comply with that injunction, he must ensure 
compliance with the fundamental right of internet users to freedom of information. 
In this respect, the measures adopted by the internet service provider must be strictly targeted, in 
the sense that they must serve to bring an end to a third party’s infringement of copyright or of a 
related right but without thereby affecting internet users who are using the provider’s services in 
order to lawfully access information. Failing that, the provider’s interference in the freedom of 
information of those users would be unjustified in the light of the objective pursued.”226 
There are a couple of things that are worth noting in these two passages of the judgement. 
Regarding the first paragraph it is useful to point out that, similarly to Scarlet and Netlog, the 
Court recognizes the rights of all internet users as opposed to only balancing the rights of the 
IP-owner and the service provider227. This obviously considerably empowers the position of the 
freedom of information. Regarding the second paragraph, it is evident that in addition to the 
broadness of the protectable freedom of information, any restrictions for this freedom are almost 
automatically unproportioned: the measures taken by the intermediary cannot “affect” users 
who lawfully access information, and if the service provider fails in this regard, the measure 
will be considered “unjustified”. 
                                                 
224 UPC Telekabel Wien (n 146). 
225 ibid para 47. 
226 ibid paras 55 – 56. 
227 Izyumenko (n 192) 119. 
 
49 
 
The position of freedom of information seems to further strengthen in the following two 
passages of the judgement. First, the Court gives the national Courts the task of ensuring that 
the internet users have a possibility “to assert their rights” after the measures taken by the 
service provider become clear228. Secondly, the Court notes that it may indeed be impossible 
for the intermediary to find such a measure that brings an end to the infringing activities once 
and for all229. Both of these arguments seemed also have found their way in the Directive and 
manifest themselves in the respective paragraphs of 9 and 5(b) of Article 17 of the Directive. 
Despite understandably avoiding giving exact instructions on which measures taken by the 
intermediary are in the field of fair balance, the Court did offer some guidelines on the nature 
of a measure that fulfill the requirements of a fair balance between the two rights. The Court 
set out two preconditions for these measures: 
(i) ”the measures taken do not unnecessarily deprive internet users of the possibility of 
lawfully accessing the information available and 
(ii) those measures have the effect of preventing unauthorised access to the protected subject-
matter or, at least, of making it difficult to achieve and of seriously discouraging internet 
users who are using the services of the addressee of that injunction from accessing the 
subject-matter that has been made available to them in breach of the intellectual property 
right—”230 
Regarding the first precondition, the Court seems to have taken a step back from the assessment 
of previous paragraphs regarding the position of freedom of information. That is, instead of 
completely prohibiting any kind of negative effects that may be occur concerning the lawful 
accessing of the information, the Court only prohibits “unnecessary” detriment towards this 
goal. As for the second precondition, the Court stays its course stating that a fool-proof measure 
taken by the service provider might be impossible to achieve. Nevertheless, the Court does try 
to underline the importance of property rights by giving the measure requirements that are strict, 
so that its effect wouldn’t be unnoticeable regarding the protection of IP-rights and thus 
detrimental to the idea behind fair balance. This approach of making copyright violations 
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“difficult to achieve” and “seriously discouraging” acts leading to it has also been called a “dual 
minimum threshold”231. 
The case of Akdeniz232, like Telekabel, was about an injunction towards a specific website. This 
ECtHR-case dealt with the blocking of access to “myspace.com” and “last.fm” in Turkey, as 
these websites were used for copyright infringements. The applicant argued that this injunction 
violated his right to information under Article 10 ECHR, as he was a user of these websites and 
could no longer access non-infringing information relevant to him. ECtHR refused the claim of 
the applicant on the basis that the websites in question were by no means the only source of 
identical information available to him, nor did they contain information specifically important 
to him233. What this decision means for the fair balancing exercise in European context is that 
unlike CJEU, ECtHR does not seem to recognize the rights of an individual user of a website 
in its fair balancing exercise234, which seems to favor the position of intellectual property as a 
fundamental right. 
The next case in which the CJEU balanced these two rights was McFadden235, in which suitable 
preventive actions concerning possible copyright infringmenets to be taken by a Wifi service 
provider were reviewed by CJEU. As in many other cases with the involvement of an 
intermediary the balancing exercise did not solely concern the relationship between only two 
fundamental rights. However, as in the Telekabel-case, there are still some things to learn 
regarding the relationship between the freedom of information and IP-rights specifically. 
After categorically ruling out other possible measures to be taken by the intermediary that were 
proposed by the referring court, CJEU turns towards the third “option”, which was the password 
protection of the Wifi-connection, the purpose of which was to force possible copyright 
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perpetrators to reveal their identity236. Here, unlike in its previous judgements concerning the 
injunction towards and online intermediary, the Court starts to offer hints towards the definition 
of “essence” of right to information. Specifically, the Court states: 
” -- a measure consisting in securing an internet connection does not appear to be such as to 
undermine the essence of the right to freedom of information of the recipients of an internet 
network access service, in so far as it is limited to requiring such recipients to request a password, 
it being clear furthermore that that connection constitutes only one of several means of accessing 
the internet.” 
 As explained in chapter two of this paper, the essence of a right is its “core”, which cannot be 
violated. The Court argues here that the essence of right to information stays untouched, as the 
Wifi-connection in question is only one of multiple ways of accessing the internet237. The 
Courts arguments concerning the essence of the right to information seem to thus fall in line 
with those of ECtHR in Akdeniz, where the question regarding the external right to information 
was not seen to be violated, as there were other ways of accessing the information in question. 
The Court then moves on to refer its judgements in Telekabel by reinstating that the lawful 
access of information cannot be hampered by the injunction, and if this would occur, the 
measure would consequently be considered unjustified. Also following Telekabel, CJEU then 
argues that the measure to be taken by the intermediary must fulfill the “dual threshold”.238 
Finally, after confirming the suitability and necessity of the measure239, the CJEU concludes 
that a password protected Wifi does strike a fair balance between the competing fundamental 
rights240. 
4.4 Conclusions on the established fair balance between freedom of expression and 
information and intellectual property and its relevance regarding Article 17 of the 
Directive 
Despite the fluctuating manner in which the CJEU has taken the fair balancing exercise into 
account in cases having to do with freedom of expression or information and right to intellectual 
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property, there are still some common elements and patterns visible in these judgements 
regarding the outcome of the balancing operation. First, there is the changing importance in the 
role of right to information. Secondly, the lawful access to information has been established as 
an integral part of the proportionality review. Thirdly, there seems to be an ongoing change in 
the way the Court perceives the balance between the freedom of expression and the right to 
intellectual property. 
There seems to have happened a considerable shift in the balance of freedom of information 
and IP-rights. From its humble roots in Laserdisken, where the balancing exercise concerning 
the right to information was seemingly added as an afterthought, the right to information has 
since proved to be right in the center stage of the fair balancing exercise, perhaps most notably 
in Telekabel. One great factor in this ascension to significance has been the recognition of the 
rights of the users as opposed to only considering the rights of the intermediaries, which has 
undoubtedly increased the pressure of taking the right of information properly into account in 
the balancing exercise.  
The first point in the balance links directly to the second. When the Court has in the judgements 
related to injunctions posed on intermediaries contemplated the proportionality of the measure 
in question, it has been of crucial importance whether the measure hinders the lawful access to 
information by the users. This lawful access to information has been in a decisive role regarding 
proportionality in both SABAM cases concerning possible filtering measures and in the website 
blocking -measure of Telekabel. Furthermore, this access to information is also referenced in 
McFadden. 
Article 17(7) of the Directive considers this lawful access to information by stating: 
“The cooperation between online content-sharing service providers and rightholders shall not 
result in the prevention of the availability of works or other subject matter uploaded by users, 
which do not infringe copyright and related rights—” 
Considering the CJEU case law relating to the relationship between right to information and 
IP-rights, it is not surprising that this provision has found its way into the article. However, how 
far can the possible filtering mechanisms put in place to prevent copyright infringements go 
before they inevitably begin to hamper the lawful access to information of individuals? It has 
not been unproblematic to try and find they fair balance between these two rights within the 
current legislative framework. Rather than aiming for an area where this balance could perhaps 
more easily be achieved, the legislature has now arguably made the balancing even more 
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challenging by burdening the intermediaries with stricter requirements, which may in many 
cases lead to overly protective practices. Considering the growing importance of right to 
information and the arguments CJEU has used in its judgements, Article 17 the Directive does 
not seem to help in achieving the balance between this right and the right to intellectual 
property. 
Furthermore, what makes matters even more difficult is the fact that the hints presented by the 
Court about the “essence” or “core” of right to information in McFadden seems to indicate that 
the core of the right is violated if a measure takes away the only mean of accessing the 
information. Taking YouTube as an example, many content providers use that platform as a 
sole mean of communicating their works to the public. If an overly restrictive measure taken 
by the intermediary in fear of liability under 17(4) of the Directive for example takes down a 
video which in fact does not infringe any copyright, this measure can be based on the reasoning 
in McFadden seen as violating the very essence of the right to information.  
It is thus possible that the Directive leads to a situation where many preliminary references that 
land before CJEU are to do with questions regarding possible violation of the core of a right by 
a measure taken by the intermediary rather than the proportionality of that measure. This, in 
turn, seems to indicate a rather drastic moving of the goal posts by the legislator and thus not 
even the sweetest of strikes by the Court, even if hitting the target, is able to ensure a truly fair 
balance between the two rights.  
This doesn’t tell a story of a logical continuum of the balance between the two rights. The 
legislator perhaps makes a steeper than needed turn towards the right holders of intellectual 
property. The provisions presented by Article 17 of the new copyright directive seem to be 
surprisingly rough even if the general liability of the intermediary has become more stringent 
during the past few years. As pointed out in the literature, sufficiently protecting the 
intermediaries directly leads to the protection of freedom of expression and information241. 
There seems to also be a fundamental shift in the way the Court deals with the clashes between 
the rights. As discussed before, unlike the CJEU, ECtHR has always conducted a fair balance 
review that has been based on the freedom of expression as an external right rather than as an 
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internal exception or limitation to copyright. The reason for this disparity is simple, as CJEU 
has seen the balancing act mainly as a task of the legislator. The externality of the balancing act 
is perhaps the most useful thing to be taken from these ECtHR cases relating to freedom of 
expression and IP-rights concerning CJEU, as the balancing exercise itself conducted by 
ECtHR in these cases leaves much to be desired. As explained in Chapter 2, the ECHR and the 
Charter are both implicitly and explicitly interlinked, and it is not difficult to imagine that this 
has for its part influenced CJEU’s interpretation of the internal exceptions and limitations to 
copyright. This is visible in the Court’s interpretation of the underlying rights in exceptions and 
limitations in cases such as Deckmyn and Painer and broadening the ground on which balancing 
must take place by considering the rights of the users in cases such as Scarlet and Telekabel. 
In addition, there are also indications that a more direct reference by the Court regarding the 
external significance of freedom of expression when considering the balancing with IP-rights 
may be imminent. In his Opinion in Afghanistan Papers242 AG Szpunar for the first time at EU 
level recognized that copyright has to be in “exceptional cases” restricted by external limitations 
based on freedom of expression, and looked for backing for his statement from the ECtHR cases 
of Ashby Donald and Pirate Bay243. Moreover, in his later Opinion in Pelham244 AG Szpunar 
seemed to go into more detail of what these exceptional cases could be, even if he at the same 
time also took a few steps back regarding this possible new paradigm of external review245. He 
stated that such externality of the fair balancing exercise could be possible in situations where 
the “essence” of a fundamental right is violated, the position which he later repeated in Spiegel 
Online246.  
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Even though CJEU in its judgements stuck with the exceptions and limitations presented in the 
InfoSoc Directive without considering any external review247, it is safe to say that these 
statements by the AG are the latest step in the Union coming closer to the position of ECtHR 
in terms of the balancing IP-rights with the freedom of expression and information. It is hence 
uncertain if the exceptions listed in Article 17(7) of the Directive are enough to truly represent 
the current stance of the case law regarding the forming of the fair balance. Furthermore, the 
above discussion related to the “essence” of right to information hinted in McFadden coupled 
with the AG’s points in the latest case law might lead to some problems regarding balancing in 
the current framework provided by the legislator in the Directive. 
Based on the discussion above, it is thus difficult to see Article 17 of the Directive as a piece of 
secondary legislation that logically continues the development in the balance of the two rights 
set in the Court’s judgements. First, the right of information of the users has become more 
important in the last years, and Article 17 does not help in fulfilling these new requirements. 
Secondly, if Article 17 leads to a situation where the only source of a given information is 
unavailable for the user of a platform, there may be more questions regarding whether a measure 
taken by an online content sharing service provider is infringing the essence of right to 
information. Thirdly, it is visible that there may be an upcoming shift towards a more of an 
external review regarding exceptions to copyright. Article 17 does not seem to recognize this 
possible shift. 
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5 THE FAIR BALANCE BETWEEN THE FREEDOM TO CONDUCT A 
BUSINESS AND THE RIGHT TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we are first going to introduce the freedom to conduct a business as a general 
concept in the European framework. After this, we are going to look at cases from ECtHR and 
CJEU where the relevant rights are being balanced. From this examination it can be concluded 
that freedom to conduct a business gives much room for the proper protection of intellectual 
property rights. This “flexibility” of the fundamental right seems to also indicate that core 
functions of businesses can be affected without the measure being seen as a breach of the 
essence of the right. Furthermore, increasingly stringent measures have been demanded from 
the intermediaries. 
Article 16 of the Charter covers the freedom to conduct a business. Specifically, it states as 
follows: 
”The freedom to conduct a business in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices 
is recognised.” 
The freedom to conduct a business seems to be recognized in the simplest of ways possible. 
Some might say that the recognition is even laconic when compared to other rights and 
freedoms in the Charter, for example the freedom of expression, and perhaps of lesser 
importance than many other freedoms and rights, at least if only looking at the wording of the 
Charter. 
In some ways this is true. First, the freedom to conduct a business doesn’t affect the number of 
individuals that, for example, the freedom of expression does. Furthermore, the impact often 
resonates indirectly, or at least in a fundamentally different way than with freedom of 
expression. Secondly, in its current form it is a relatively new right within the Union legal order, 
gaining legitimacy through the coming into force of the EU Charter248. Thirdly, the Charter is 
the first and only legally binding international human rights instrument that recognizes the 
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freedom to conduct a business explicitly as a fundamental right249. Fourthly, the states seem to 
have a wide margin of appreciation in restricting the right250. 
On the other hand, however, this is not the case. The freedom to conduct a business was 
indirectly referenced as early as in the judgement in Nold251. Moreover, although the term itself 
might be relatively new, it also encompasses the freedom to pursue economic or commercial 
activity, contractual freedom and free competition252. The right has also a long history in the 
constitutions of multiple Member States253, and it has been confirmed as a general principle of 
EU law254. Furthermore, the right has been in the center of multiple recent cases involving 
balancing with intellectual property rights, such as the SABAM-cases, Telekabel and McFadden. 
The purpose of freedom to conduct a business is to ensure the possibility to operate in the 
market without unnecessary State intervention255. Furthermore, even though there are close 
links with the rights of freedom to conduct a business and right to property as seen as, for 
example, in Sky Österreich, they are still in many situations very much distinguishable. A fine 
explanation of the fundamental difference between these two rights was given by AG Cruz 
Villalón in his Opinion in Alemo-Herron, in which he stated: 
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“If the right to property operates in the sphere of tangible and intangible assets, the freedom to 
conduct a business protects economic initiative and the ability to participate in a market, rather 
than the actual profit, seen in financial terms, that is earned in that market.”256 
The Advocate General thus made a distinction between protecting the access to market and 
protecting the profits of right-holders, the latter of which is protected by right to property. In 
line with this distinction are the Union’s objectives touching upon the freedom to conduct 
business. For example, demands which are set for companies because of competing priorities, 
such as copyright protection, should be proportionate257. 
The influence of the right to conduct a business is also visible in Article 17 of the Directive. 
First, it can be seen in Article 17(5), where it is stated that when determining whether the service 
provider has adequately fulfilled its obligations one must, in line with the principle of 
proportionality, look at “the availability of suitable and effective means and their cost for 
service providers”. The legislator recognizes that there might not exist a way with which a 
certain type of copyright infringement would be preventable, and even if did exist, the cost of 
this procedure may be such that it simply isn’t feasible for the service provider, thus effectively 
hindering its opportunity to engage in business within the market. 
Secondly, the effect of freedom to conduct a business can be recognized in paragraph 6, which 
provides an exception concerning the obligations for the service provider if the provider can be 
considered “new”. Specifically, if the service provider has been in the market for less than three 
years and its annual turnover does not exceed EUR 10 million, less is expected from the 
provider in order to avoid liability. In this situation, the service provider must “only” comply 
with the requirements set in paragraph 4(a)258, according of which the provider must have made 
“best efforts” in order to obtain an authorization from the right-holder, and if the provider has 
failed to do this, it has acted expeditiously to disable access to the works after receiving notice 
from the right-holder. If, however, the number of monthly visitors of the website of the provider 
exceeds 5 million, it must have also “made best efforts to prevent further uploads of the notified 
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works”. Thus, only the smallest of the service providers are seemingly still within the liability 
rules set by the earlier notice-and-takedown regime. 
Next, we are going to discuss how the demands set for the online service providers by Article 
17 of the Directive line up with the previous fair balance that has been established between the 
freedom to conduct a business and the right to intellectual property by the Court of Justice of 
the European Union. Unlike in previous chapters, here we are only focusing on the cases of 
CJEU as ECHR does not currently recognize the freedom to conduct a business as an 
independent right. Like Chapter 4, this chapter is also divided into three parts. First, we are 
going to look at the balancing exercise in cases where there is no involvement of an online 
intermediary. After this the cases where the intermediary is present are examined. The chapter 
ends with concluding remarks regarding the fair balance between the rights and its importance 
regarding Article 17 of the Directive. 
5.2 Freedom to conduct a business and intellectual property – the balancing exercise in 
cases without the involvement of an online intermediary 
Arguably the first case in which the Court started the balancing exercise between these two 
rights was Metronome Musik259, in which the validity of a provision of a directive that restricts 
the rental rights of recordings protected by copyright was being reviewed. The case didn’t for 
obvious reasons refer to the freedom to conduct a business but instead to a general principle of 
EU law: the freedom to pursue a trade or profession260. This principle has undoubtedly served 
as an inspiration when the legislator has crafted the freedom to conduct a business of the 
Charter, as it is very similar to the “freedom to pursue economic and commercial activity” 
presented as one of the corner stones of the freedom to conduct a business in the explanations 
of the Charter. 
As already explained in Chapter 3, the Article 1(1) of the rental directive261 giving the right-
holder the power to restrict the rental of copyright protected phonograms was deemed to be 
proportionate by the CJEU. What was left undiscussed, however, is how the Courts reasoning 
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could be seen affecting the balance between the rights. The most interesting parts of the 
judgement in this regard can be found in paragraphs 21 and 26. In the first of these paragraphs, 
the Court states that the restrictions on freedom to pursue a trade or profession are 
disproportionate and intolerable in so far as they impair “the very substance” of the right. In the 
latter paragraph, the Court concludes that since the rights of the copyright-holders could not be 
protected in a less intrusive way regarding the business of renting phonograms, the restriction 
provided in Article 1(1) of the rental directive cannot be considered disproportionate. 
This provides some guidelines regarding the fair balance in two ways. First, Hokamp was in 
the business of renting phonographs. The obvious result of the injunction under Article 1(1) of 
the rental directive is that it did hamper Hokamp’s business activities. However, as this 
impairment seemingly didn’t affect the business on a larger scale, it could be deemed 
proportionate. That is, these business activities could evidently at least to some extent be 
interfered with without the interference constituting as so disproportionate that it hampers the 
substance of the freedom to conduct a business even if the action is targeted directly to the core 
functions of the business. Secondly, the Court did evidently recognize the intrusive nature of 
the Article 1(1) regarding the freedom to pursue a trade or profession and indirectly suggested 
that interfering with the core activities of a business should generally be avoided as much as 
possible. 
If the “substance” of freedom to conduct business was touched upon in Metronome Musik, the 
same can be said concerning the right to intellectual property in the judgment of DR and TV2 
Danmark262, even if this reference was done in an indirect way. The case was about whether 
DR and TV2 Danmark, public radio and television broadcasting organizations, could broadcast 
recordings made by independent third-party companies and still be covered by the exception 
for the recordings in question provided in Article 5(2) of the InfoSoc Directive. 
The Court agreed that the recordings made by subcontracting companies could indeed be seen 
included under the protection of exception covered by Article 5263. The Court did not engage in 
a fair balancing exercise between the freedom to conduct a business and right to intellectual 
property per se, but it did indirectly refer to this discussion. The Court stated that this expansive 
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reading of the exception concerning copyright “ensures that broadcasting organizations have a 
greater enjoyment of the freedom to conduct a business264”. In the same sentence, the Court 
stated that this broader reading does not hamper “the substance of copyright”. 
As noted in the literature, the decision itself is not really surprising265. There are a couple of 
points to be taken away from the decision regarding fair balance between the rights, however. 
First, the ruling affirms that the broad interpretation of the exceptions and limitations to 
copyright is not only used when freedom of expression and information is in question, it also 
seems to apply to “lesser” rights such as freedom to conduct a business. Secondly, similar to 
the arguments concerning freedom to conduct a business in Metronome Musik, core activities 
which are protected by the fundamental right can be touched without it impairing the substance 
of a right. This time it is freedom to conduct a business that hampers the copyright and not vice 
versa, however. Thirdly, if the “very substance” and “substance” of a right can indeed be 
understood as interchangeable with the term “essence” used in Article 52(1) of the Charter, as 
suggested in the literature266, some information regarding of what doesn’t constitute as an 
essence of freedom to conduct a business or intellectual property can perhaps be gathered from 
the respective judgements of Metronome Musik and TV2 Danmark. 
A case that didn’t strive to find a fair balance between the rights but nevertheless provides some 
information regarding the Courts stance of the relationship of the rights is Sky Österreich267. 
Even though based on the judgements of Metronome Musik and TV2 Danmark it could be 
concluded that the core activities protected by neither freedom to conduct a business and the 
right to intellectual property are untouchable, it still seems from the ruling of the Court in Sky 
Österreich that the “substance” or “essence” of freedom to conduct a business is more difficult 
to violate. That is, the essence of the right to intellectual property is more carefully protected 
by the Court. 
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As discussed in the previous chapter, the Court did not consider the broadcasting rights held by 
Sky Österreich to fall under the fundamental right protection of Article 17 of the Charter. Unlike 
the Opinion of the AG, the judgement almost solely focused on the fair balance between the 
freedom to conduct a business and the freedom of information. Regarding the violation of the 
essence of the right, the Court stated that the provision in question does not hamper the “core 
content” of freedom to conduct a business as no business activity is prevented “from being 
carried out”268. Moreover, the Court stated in the same paragraph, the right holders of the 
broadcasting rights can, despite the provision, continue to use their rights as they please, for 
example granting the license to another economic operator on a contractual basis. The latter 
acknowledgment of the right holder’s position is somewhat curious because the Court had 
rejected the application of Article 17 of the Charter. Furthermore, in this latter statement, it 
seems to be more concerned with the profits of the right holder rather than the access to market. 
Despite its rejection of the Article 17 the Court thus seems to at some level recognize the 
existence of intellectual property rights in the judgement. The reason for the rejection becomes 
clearer when the Court states: 
”On the basis of that case‑law and in the light of the wording of Article 16 of the Charter, which 
differs from the wording of the other fundamental freedoms laid down in Title II thereof, yet is 
similar to that of certain provisions of Title IV of the Charter, the freedom to conduct a business 
may be subject to a broad range of interventions on the part of public authorities which may limit 
the exercise of economic activity in the public interest.”269 
It is noteworthy that the Court focuses the attention on the different wording of Article 16 when 
compared to other rights that are under the Charter, recognizing the impression given by the 
article that national authorities have perhaps greater powers to restrict the right than other 
fundamental rights without similar wording in the Charter270. Moreover, the Court sees this to 
be in harmony with its own case law that also sees the freedom to conduct a business as a right 
that is perhaps not as clearly defined as other rights271. 
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All in all, even though the decisions in Metronome Musik and TV2 Danmark seemed to give 
the impression that both the freedom to conduct a business and right to property can, in certain 
situations, be restricted in a way that affects the core functions protected by the rights, after Sky 
Österreich it is clear that “essence” or “substance” of the freedom to conduct a business is 
greatly more prone to adjustments if need be. The view found in literature, according of which 
the Court recognizes the flexibility and ambiguity of the right both in its own case-law and in 
the Charter, is also visible in Article 17 of the Directive. It is perhaps most clearly manifested 
in the general idea of the Directive: as a result of the stricter liability, in practice it may no 
longer be possible for an online content sharing provider to engage in the market if it cannot 
adequately lessen the amount of third party copyright infringements present in its platform. Of 
course, these requirements are set for better protection of the right to intellectual property, 
however, it is difficult to imagine a way in which the legislator could have gone any further 
with the requirements set for the content sharing provider without effectively touching the very 
essence of freedom to conduct a business. 
5.3 Freedom to conduct a business and intellectual property – the balancing exercise in 
cases with the involvement of an online intermediary 
The first case with the involvement of an intermediary and which recognized the importance of 
fair balance of the rights in question was Scarlet Extended272. In a paragraph addressing 
specifically the effects of the proposed injunction on the freedom to conduct business, the Court 
stated: 
  ”Accordingly, such an injunction would result in a serious infringement of the freedom of the 
ISP concerned to conduct its business since it would require that ISP to install a complicated, 
costly, permanent computer system at its own expense, which would also be contrary to the 
conditions laid down in Article 3(1) of Directive 2004/48, which requires that measures to ensure 
the respect of intellectual-property rights should not be unnecessarily complicated or costly.”273 
There are several things to be taken away from this paragraph. The Court looks at the 
proportionality of the measure both considering the protectable fundamental right itself and 
additionally in light of the Enforcement Directive. Firstly, it is crucial to note that, even though 
the Court does not talk about the violation of “essence” or “substance” of the right, it still 
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considers the infringement to be “serious”. Obviously, CJEU then recognizes that the 
characteristics of the proposed measure are against the instructions given in the Enforcement 
Directive for such measures. However, from the wording used by the Court, it seems that some 
individual elements or the combination of these elements alone lead to an unproportioned 
restriction on freedom to conduct a business. These elements are the complicated, permanent 
and costly nature of the proposed measure. 
The problems of a an excessively costly measures taken by online intermediaries had already 
been recognized earlier in L’Oréal v. eBay274, even though the Court in this judgement didn’t 
try to find a fair balance between freedom to conduct a business and the right to intellectual 
property. Similarly, the prohibition of general monitoring obligation to be taken by the 
intermediary was affirmed to be against the Enforcement Directive in both cases275. Regarding 
the freedom to conduct a business, the stance of the Court was repeated in almost word for word 
in the Netlog276 judgement of the following year. 
If stopping the examination of the case law here, one could see a clear mismatch with the 
demands made for the online content sharing provider in Article 17 of the Directive. It is 
perhaps good to note that all intermediaries in the three aforementioned cases are different both 
in nature and in business activities they perform: Scarlet is an internet service provider, eBay is 
an electronic marketplace operator and Netlog, perhaps closest to the online content sharing 
provider meant in Article 17, is a runner of an online social networking platform. However, 
despite the different nature of these intermediaries, all three cases seemed to have a common 
conception of what constitutes as a “serious” violation of freedom to conduct a business. In 
Article 17, the only one of these elements seems to remain, and that is the costliness of the 
measure. Looking at the article, between the cases discussed here and the drafting of the 
provision, the possible complicated and permanent nature of the systems designed to crucially 
lessen the amount of copyright infringements seem to have ceased to be relevant.  As discussed 
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above, the problems relating to the costliness of the measure are recognized in paragraphs 5 and 
6 of the article277. 
To perhaps better understand the changes that have occurred in this time period and the disparity 
between the abovementioned cases and the provisions in Article 17, it is useful to look further 
in this line of case law of the Court. An illuminating case in this regard is the judgement of 
UPC Telekabel278, which was also the first case that explicitly balanced these two fundamental 
rights279 after Netlog. The Court gives a rare bit of information about the content of this right, 
stating: 
”The freedom to conduct a business includes, inter alia, the right for any business to be able to 
freely use, within the limits of its liability for its own acts, the economic, technical and financial 
resources available to it.”280 
However, CJEU did not recognize that the injunction in question positioned towards Telekabel, 
an internet service provider, touched the “very substance” of its freedom to conduct a 
business281. The Courts indirect view seemed to be that the undetermined nature of the 
injunction to be taken by Telekabel to block access to the copyright infringing website helped 
in keeping its fundamental right of freedom to conduct a business intact. This, the Court argued, 
was because the intermediary could then freely choose to “put in measures” which suit him the 
best by considering the resources that are available to him282. Furthermore, by doing this, the 
intermediary can avoid liability by showcasing that all “reasonable measures” have been 
taken283. 
It seems that the changes between the opinion of the Court in earlier case law and demands set 
for the intermediary in Article 17 of the Directive were thus realized here. As the intermediary 
was given the freedom to decide of the measure to be taken, the “complicated” and “permanent” 
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nature of such measure was not relevant in the light of the facts of the case, as the intermediary 
could, in the Courts view, have complete control over these unavoidable aspects of the measure. 
A dissenting view was offered by AG Cruz Villalón in his Opinion284. First, he argues, the fair 
balance should be struck when the injunction is first ordered. If there are no specific measures 
to be taken by the intermediary, this balance will be considered at a much later stage, perhaps 
even after the measure has already taken effect285. The Advocate General then continues by 
stating that the intermediary must also succeed in balancing between the right of information 
of its customers and the intellectual property rights of the applicants, even though Telekabel as 
an ISP has no direct connection to the website where the actual infringement occurs286. 
Even though Telekabel indeed is an ISP instead of an online content sharing provider within 
the meaning of Article 17 of the Directive, the point made by the AG together with the ruling 
of CJEU, which approved of such outcome injunction, seems to point towards a more general 
shift towards putting more pressure towards the service provider in solving the fair balance 
dilemma. This undoubtedly has consequences on the freedom to conduct a business of the 
service provider, as resources must now be put on functions that have perhaps before been 
entirely unfamiliar for the provider of the service. Now, as also pointed out in the literature, the 
providers are suddenly burdened with tasks that have been previously accomplished by the 
legislator and the Court287. 
There are some similarities to be found with the Courts assessment in Telekabel regarding this 
balancing done by the ISP when looking at the provisions of Article 17 of the Directive. Firstly, 
paragraph 4 of the article is essentially an outcome prohibition, as no specific measures to be 
taken by the content sharing provider are introduced. Only the outcome, the unavailability of 
copyright protected material by “best efforts” taken by the content sharing provider, is 
demanded. Secondly, paragraph 7 and 9 affirm that the legitimate use of such sites, such as the 
use under the exceptions and limitations concerning copyright, shall not be affected by the 
Directive. Thus, it seems that the great power and responsibility of balancing lies even more 
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clearly than in Telekabel within the hands of the service provider. Obviously, some of this is 
explained by the more participating and committed role of the content sharing provider when 
compared to the role of an ISP. However, this may not lessen the impact the fair balancing 
exercise has for the content sharing provider as a business, as the greater responsibility has 
undoubtedly consequences for the core functions of the service provider. 
Continuing with the ruling of McFadden288, the CJEU here did to some extent balance the 
freedom to conduct a business with the right to intellectual property. Regarding this balancing, 
the issue centered around the question of which kind of an injunction could a Wi-Fi service 
provider be given in order to prevent copyright infringements happening through the use of the 
Wi-Fi connection without the injunction violating the essence of freedom to conduct a business.  
Regarding the option of complete termination of the internet connection the Court resolutely 
argued that such injunction would cause a “serious infringement” towards the freedom to 
conduct a business of the Wi-Fi connection provider, as the person pursuing an economic 
activity could no longer pursue that activity289. It is perhaps telling that, unlike AG Szpunar in 
his Opinion290, the Court refused to refer to the essence of the right being violated, even though 
it is difficult to imagine a more clear-cut example of the essence of freedom to conduct a 
business being infringed. Later the Court accepted the password-protection as a viable option 
to ensure a fair balance between the interests of the copyright holders and those of the freedom 
to conduct a business. This time the essence of freedom to conduct a business was referenced, 
albeit shortly, when CJEU stated that “marginal” technical adjustments that the business 
operator must do cannot constitute as the breach of the essence of exercising its activities291. 
5.4 Conclusions on the established fair balance between freedom to conduct a business and 
the right to intellectual property and its relevance regarding Article 17 of the Directive 
Based on the discussion above, it is possible to identify both some ongoing trends and clear 
shift in the position of CJEU when looking at its case law concerning the balancing of freedom 
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to conduct a business and right to intellectual property. Firstly, it is possible to recognize certain 
elements of the “core functions” that the Court recognizes regarding both rights. Secondly, 
some understanding can be derived from these judgements concerning the essence of the rights. 
Thirdly, after the judgement in Telekabel, a major shift in the balance of these rights can be 
recognized. All these points will be discussed in relation to the demands set by Article 17 of 
the Directive. 
Core activities or functions are those activities that are primarily protected by the relevant 
articles of the Charter. Regarding the freedom to conduct a business, it can for example mean 
freedom to engage in economic or commercial activity and freedom to contract292. As for the 
right to intellectual property, the core functions are, among other things, to freely enjoy the use 
of the property and to a certain extent restrict the use of such property.  
It is clear both from the legislation and case-law that neither of the rights in question are 
absolute, that is, the core functions and activities are not absolutely protected by the Charter. 
As evident already in the earlier case-law, even the core activities protected by the articles of 
the Charter are not untouchable. However, as evident from the wording used by CJEU in Sky 
Österreich, the freedom to conduct a business is considered as a lesser right when compared to 
other rights protected in the Charter. Thus, it seems that the essence of the freedom to conduct 
a business is perhaps more flexible than the essence protected by the right to intellectual 
property. That is, the essence of the freedom to conduct a business seems to cover a somewhat 
“smaller” area and is not as easily violated as the essence of the right to intellectual property. 
Perhaps the greatest difference affecting the established fair balance between the protection of 
these two rights is the element of activity that can be required from the intermediary without 
this activity violating the essence of the right. This is in stark contrast to the right to intellectual 
property, as the intellectual property owner must only passively withstand the use of its property 
in certain exceptional situations. 
The level of activity that can be demanded from the service provider has only been raised during 
the last seven years or so with the major shift happening between the SABAM-cases293and 
Telekabel. After the SABAM-cases, and to a certain extent the L’Oréal v. eBay, any permanent, 
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excessively costly or overly complicated measures taken by the intermediary was deemed as 
too intrusive concerning the freedom to conduct a business. The fundamental shift happened in 
Telekabel, in which the Court only seemed to focus on the problems caused by the possibly 
costly nature of the measure demanded from the provider of the service.  
The increased level of activity that can be requested from the service provider has, however, 
been made manifestly clear in the Directive and has perhaps went even a bit further in this 
regard. At least looking at paragraph 4 of Article 17 it certainly looks like there is a significant 
increase in the proactivity required from the online content sharing provider. This is evident in 
the obligation for the intermediary to obtain an authorization from the right holder and the 
obligation to ensure the unavailability of protected works, if the copyright holder has provided 
the necessary information for the intermediary. In addition to this information sharing, the 
activity required from the copyright holder is limited to notifications regarding alleged 
copyright infringements. 
As in the Telekabel-judgement, the permanent and complicated nature of the possible mean the 
intermediary can use to prevent copyright infringements from occurring on its platform is no 
longer an issue in the Directive as long as the measure to be taken is “suitable and effective”. 
The cost of the measure for the intermediary, on the other hand, is still relevant in the Directive. 
However, it is also unclear in the Directive how the costs of the measure are calculated, as 
alongside direct costs related to the technical aspects of the measure there are undoubtedly 
indirect costs associated with implementing such measures. These indirect costs might consist 
of, among other things, the cost of acquiring know-how related to the balancing exercise, as the 
online content sharing provider has now practically been entrusted with this task. Many things 
have clearly changed since its ruling in Promusicae, where CJEU confirmed that establishing 
a fair balance is primarily a task of the Union. 
The Telekabel-case is hence the most significant step towards the balance established by the 
legislator in Article 17 of the Directive. Thus, coupled with the fact that the position of an online 
service provider, the provisions of Article 17 can be seen as a continuum that has been heavily 
inspired by the developments in the case law. Regarding the balance between the rights in 
question, the leap in the perceived balance between the rights has already happened earlier, 
notably between the SABAM-cases and Telekabel. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The purpose of this paper was to evaluate whether the fair balance between competing 
fundamental rights set in the Article 17 of the new copyright directive is in line with the previous 
case law of the Union. This has been evaluated by looking at those cases of ECtHR and CJEU 
that have affected the position of an online service provider and the balance between intellectual 
property rights and the rights that are most likely to be affected by the Directive: the freedom 
to conduct a business and the freedom of expression and information. 
During the last decade or so the position of an online service provider has become stricter 
regarding its liability for copyright infringing activities that have been done using its services. 
Even though there have been contestable cases both for and against IP-rights during this time, 
it is difficult to argue against the notion that the position of intellectual property as a 
fundamental right has also strengthened during this period. This change in the position is mostly 
the result of the stricter requirements that can be set for the service providers, as the providers 
of the services have been the target of a growing number of demands in order to protect IP-
rights in the case law of CJEU. Other strong fundamental rights, such as data privacy, have had 
to give way for the effective enforcement of intellectual property rights. Thus, the stricter 
requirements set for the online content sharing provider in Article 17 of the Directive can be 
deemed as continuation of the example set by the Union in its case law. 
Concerning the established balance between the freedom to conduct a business and right to 
intellectual property the position assumed by the legislator is not surprising either. That is, when 
put against IP-rights, the freedom to conduct a business has given more and more room for the 
effective enforcement of IP-rights in a steady fashion. In general, freedom to conduct a business 
seems to be right that is “less valuable”, as also pointed out by the Court in Sky Österreich. In 
addition, the online service provider has been subject to growingly stringent measures, as the 
previously troublesome “permanent and complicated” nature of the measures no longer seems 
to be a problem for the fair balance between the two rights. 
All in all, it is safe to say that considerably more proactivity can be required from the service 
provider in Article 17 of the Directive than in the previous EU copyright legislation, which has 
focused more on the reactive measures relating to notice and takedown procedures. However, 
one could argue that the Directive only reaffirms the steps taken towards this more active role 
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by CJEU in its judgements, and thus the consequent restrictions on the freedom to conduct a 
business are not unprecedented. Moreover, as in the previous set of directives, any monitoring 
obligations set for the online service providers are still prohibited in Article 17, a situation 
which has also been clear in the case law. However, the type of outcome prohibition that can 
be required from the service provider in Article 17 seems to shift closer to this type of 
monitoring obligation, even though this shift has also been apparent in the case law and 
therefore is not unprecedented. 
It has also become clear that the measures that can be required from the service provider can 
affect the core activities of their business without the measures violating the essence of freedom 
to conduct a business. Even though Article 17 only demands that the content sharing provider 
strives to rid its platform of infringing material with its “best efforts”, it does seem to indicate 
that a considerable amount of resources must be allocated to complete this requirement. 
Furthermore, even if the platform would be able to do this, it by no means guarantees the 
complete eradication of copyright infringing material, as even the best current systems designed 
to detect this material are far from perfect. It remains to be seen what these “best efforts” are 
going to be in practice. Nonetheless, national legislators should be careful not to establish zero-
tolerance for copyright infringing material when implementing the Directive. Otherwise, a real 
risk for the violation of essence of freedom to conduct a business might occur, as for most 
operators of the market this would be an impossible task to accomplish. 
This task is not made any easier if considering that, in practice, the online content sharing 
provider is now responsible for the balancing exercise between the freedom of expression and 
information and the intellectual property rights at least to a certain extent. Traditionally, the 
balancing exercise has been a competence of the Union, however, the unspecified “best efforts” 
and outcome prohibitions that are evident in the Directive increasingly shift this responsibility 
to the service provider. This will undoubtedly make the burden heavier for the provider. 
However, this shift in responsibility is not a sudden introduction of Article 17 but rather a 
gradual shift in the balance between the freedom to conduct a business and IP-rights that has 
occurred in the case law during the last decade. 
Regarding the balance between the freedom of expression and information and intellectual 
property it seems that Article 17 does not follow the case law so clearly. The first major reason 
for this is that the Court has increasingly considered the rights of the users or the services. That 
is, the right to information as a fundamental right has become significantly stronger as the Court 
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has established that unnecessarily depriving users of the right to lawful information is an 
unproportioned restriction. At the same time, however, the requirements set for the service 
provider in Article 17 may have negative consequences for the lawful access to information if 
the service provider implements overly protective technologies to shield itself from liability. 
Moreover, if the decision of ECtHR in Akdeniz and the judgement of CJEU in Telekabel are 
anything to go by, problems regarding the violation of the “essence” of freedom of information 
may arise. Both judgments have argued that taking away the only available mean of accessing 
information may constitute as a violation of this core of the right. Many content creators use 
certain platforms as a sole mean of communicating their works to the public, and if this service 
provider for example decides to cease its operations entirely within the Union, the sole mean of 
accessing the information also disappears. Regarding the access to information, the 
requirements of Article 17 might therefore lead to a situation where national courts and CJEU 
more often contemplate the possible violation of the essence of the right rather than the 
proportionality of a measure taken by an online service provider. It is difficult to argue that this 
“balance” achieved by the legislator in Article 17 is in line with previous case law, in which the 
importance of lawful access to information has been underlined by the Court on many 
occasions. 
It is also possible that the Union is beginning to implement a more external review of the 
balance between freedom of expression and intellectual property rights. So far works such as 
parodies and reviews have been protected under internal exceptions to copyright, and Article 
17 continues this familiar path. However, arguments in cases such as Deckmyn and Painer point 
towards a broader understanding of these exceptions. Furthermore, in a couple of recent cases 
the Advocate General has for the first time offered hints towards a more external review of 
fundamental rights instead of the current exception paradigm of copyright law. According to 
the AG, this review should be implemented in situations where the essence of a right is at risk 
of being infringed. As apparent in the discussion above, the essence of freedom to expression 
and information might be at risk of being violated if the information is entirely unavailable to 
the public. If CJEU begins to move towards the position of an external review used in ECHR, 
the exceptions which Article 17 relies on might not continue to represent the fair balance set by 
the Court. 
All in all, the question of how well the provisions of Article 17 follow the case law concerning 
the liability of the online intermediary and the balance between the relevant fundamental rights 
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is twofold. On one hand, the stricter requirements set for the online content sharing provider 
have been gradually developing during the last decade. Similarly, the worsening position of 
freedom to conduct a business and the growing importance of IP-rights is in line with the case 
law of the last few years. On the other hand, the still unforeseen consequences that may occur 
regarding the freedom to conduct a business and their direct impact to the freedom of expression 
and information may cause significant problems for the national legislators who are striving to 
sustain the fair balance between the rights when implementing the Directive. 
Thus, it cannot be said that Article 17 of the Directive completely fails in its representation of 
the established fair balance between the fundamental rights discussed in this paper, however, 
the article cannot be seen as a complete success either. Obviously, updating the field of 
copyright law after an enormous technological leap regarding third-party content sharing 
providers was long overdue. This rings true even if Article 17 in some parts appears to be a 
panicky maneuver by the legislator resulting in perhaps stricter than needed measures in order 
to protect intellectual property at the expense of other fundamental rights. 
 
